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中央政策能否有效落地与地方政府的政策响应行为紧密相关。既有研究围绕地方政府对同一中央政策的差异化响应行为已提出多种解释，但较少关注绩效反馈的影响。本研究以“省以下环保机构监测监察执法垂直管理制度改革”(简称“环保垂改”)为研究对象，基于2016年9月至2020年12月286个地级市的月度面板数据，采用Cox比例风险模型和零膨胀泊松回归模型揭示了绩效反馈与地方政府政策响应行为间的关系。研究发现，绝对环境绩效反馈较差的地方政府会缓慢、高强度地响应“环保垂改”政策，且该效应主要通过提高风险承担意愿实现；负向和正向历史环境绩效反馈越大的地方政府越倾向于缓慢、低强度地响应“环保垂改”政策，且该效应主要通过降低环境注意力实现；负向和正向社会环境绩效反馈对地方政策响应速度和强度均无显著影响。此外，经济发展水平强化了绝对绩效反馈、负向历史环境绩效反馈和正向历史环境绩效反馈对响应速度的作用，但抑制了绝对绩效反馈、正向历史环境绩效反馈及正向社会环境绩效反馈对响应强度的影响；公众环保关注度强化了绝对绩效反馈及负向历史环境绩效反馈对响应速度，以及正向历史环境绩效反馈对响应强度的影响。上述研究结果深化了对绩效反馈影响政府管理决策行为机制的理解，为进一步引导地方政府积极响应中央政策提供了实践启示。
Abstract：Whether central policies can be effectively implemented is closely related to the policy response behavior of local governments. Existing studies have explained the response of local governments to central policies from many different perspectives. However, the impact of performance feedback has been somewhat understudied. To fill the gap, this paper looks at China's environmental vertical management reform(EVMR) below the provincial level.The paper identifies three types of performance feedback: absolute environmental performance feedback, positive and negative historical environmental performance feedback, and positive and negative social environmental performance feedback. On this basis, it explores the relationship among the different types of performance feedback and the policy response behavior of local governments in adopting the EVMR based on a monthly panel dataset of 286 cities from September 2016 to December 2020 and a Cox proportional hazards model and a zero-Inflated Poisson regression model. The results show that after receiving poor absolute environmental performance feedback and positive or negative historical environmental performance feedback local governments are more likely to slow their speed of EVMR adoption. After receiving negative historical environmental performance feedback, local governments are more likely to respond to the EVMR with a high intensity. But neither positive or negative social environmental performance feedback has a significant impact on the speed and intensity of the local response. Analysis of the mechanism indicates that the effects of environmental performance feedback on the local response mainly occurs through a willingness to take risks and the environmental attention of the local governments. In addition, economic development positively moderates the relationship between absolute environmental performance feedback and the speed and intensity of the local response as well as the relationship between both positive and negative historical environmental performance feedback and the speed of the local response. However, economic development negatively moderates the relationship between absolute environmental performance feedback, positive historical environmental performance feedback, positive social environmental performance feedback, and the intensity of the local response, respectively. Last, public environmental attention positively moderates the relationship between absolute environmental performance feedback, negative historical environmental performance feedback, and the speed of the local response, respectively, as well as the relationship between positive historical environmental performance feedback and the intensity of the local response. Overall, these findings advance our understanding of the mechanism through which performance feedback influences local government decision-making behavior and provide implications for instructing local governments to proactively respond to central policies.
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(1)鉴于空气污染是我国当前最普遍和最突出的环境问题之一,本文选取空气质量指数(AQI)来衡量地方环境绩效。
(2)资料来源:https://www.hbzhan.com/news/detail/dy111588_p1.html。
基本信息:
中图分类号:D630
引用信息:
[1]刘磊,唐美琳.“优等生”和“后进生”的选择:绩效反馈如何影响地方政府政策响应行为[J].公共管理评论,2025,7(04):74-103.
基金信息:
四川大学青年杰出人才培育项目“环境分权对环境治理绩效的影响效应与作用机制:基于‘环保垂改’的实证研究”(项目批准号:SKSYL2023-10)的资助