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“红色物业”是党建引领基层社会治理的制度创新。既有研究对于基层党建提升社区治理实效进行了经验提炼,归纳总结出多种具有解释力的引领机制和若干具有实践性的引领路径。在现有研究成果的基础上,从组织结构、体制机制的角度进一步解释“引领”,能够使“党建”与“治理”间的制度连接机制更加清晰。“红色物业”的制度逻辑在于,物业公司通过党建工作调动社区治理资源、获得权力外观,进而实现对社区治理格局的调整。对两个典型“红色物业”实例进行分析发现:一方面,“红色物业”取得了即时性成效,形式上实现了社区治理各主体多方共赢,从这个角度看,“红色物业”是有效的;但另一方面,“红色物业”的具体内容只是各方法定义务、法定职责的再述,建设“红色物业”与法定的社区治理内容的实现并无逻辑联系,亦即“红色”与否并不应当影响治理实践。更进一步,“红色物业”可能存在缺乏制度增量、导致职能错位、引起结构失衡等深层次问题,从这个角度看,“红色物业”是没有实效且缺乏可持续性的。“红色物业”是社会治理的缩影,评价“红色物业”的治理效能,既要看到其在当前治理实践中取得的成绩,也要反思其存在的制度性不足。“红色物业”也是党政体制在社区层面的微观再现,要在法治的总体思路下探索基层社会治理路径。
Abstract：The “red property” that originated in Wuhan has been widely used in more than a hundred cities in China in recent years. It is positioned as an institutional innovation for party building to lead grassroots social governance. Its practice in various places can be summarized as the following: in community governance, organically combining party building work with property services, and by giving play to the leadership role of grassroots party organizations and the leading role of party members and cadres,establishing an effective solution to property conflicts and disputes, significantly improving the service level of property management, and effectively improving the effectiveness of the working mechanism of community governance.The institutional logic of “ red property” consists of property companies mobilizing community governance resources through party building work, gaining the appearance of power, and then realizing adjustments in the pattern of community governance. An analysis of two typical “red property” cases finds that, on the one hand, “red property”has achieved immediate results and formally has achieved a win-win situation for all parties involved in community governance; but, on the other hand, it is merely a restatement of the statutory obligations and legal responsibilities of all parties, and there still exist deepseated problems, such as a lack of an institutional increment resulting in a dislocation of functions and structural imbalances. For the owners, the changes brought about by the property company increasing investments in services and improving the quality of services are visibly felt. At this level, “red property” is valid. However, after a careful analysis of the institutional logic of “ red property”, the construction of “ red property” has not brought about any institutional increment. Whether it is a property company or a neighborhood committee, the work that is carried out under the name of “red property” is a legal obligation and the actual performance of statutory duties. That is to say, in strict accordance with legal norms, regardless of whether there is “ red property ”, such community governance work and property services work should be carried out by the property company. There is no correlation between “red” and “property”, and there is no logical connection between “property” and the “effectiveness of governance”.“Red property” is the epitome of social governance. To evaluate the governance effectiveness of “ red property”, we should not only see its achievements in current governance practices, but also reflect upon the existing institutional deficiencies. The inherent limitations of “red property” are rooted in the dependence of market players on the appearance of power, especially the right to speak politically. Promoting activities that should be regulated by law and regulated by the market through party building work may break the balance of governance. Of course, this is not a new problem. The essence of the problem faced by “red property” is to determine how to adjust the relationship between party and government and how to balance the party and government structure. In order to solve the ineffectiveness of “ red property ” or to directly avoid a recurrence of unsustainable governance mechanisms such as “red property”, it is important to explore the limits of political party governance and law-based governance in social governance.Specific to community governance, under the premise of fully guaranteeing the legal operation of administrative powers, market rights, and homeowners' rights, it is necessary to give full play to the value of the integrated role of the will of political party, so that the party becomes a leader of governance beliefs rather than a substitute for governance actions.
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(1)以“红色物业”为主题关键词在中国知网进行检索可知,自2017年至今用于宣传“红色物业”制度实践的报刊文章有近200篇;粗略估算有近百座城市提炼宣传了“红色物业”治理经验。
(1)根据访谈对象类型和日期进行匿名处理,E表示物业服务企业员工,O表示业主,G表示政府工作人员,字母后的两位数字为受访者序号,后续数字为访谈日期。
(1)需要说明的是,F党支部作为F小区的党支部,其成立动力来源于F小区所在的C社区的社区党委。但C社区党委主要发挥指导作用,具体事务多由Z公司承担。
(1)《民法典》第九百三十八条第一款:“物业服务合同的内容一般包括服务事项、服务质量、服务费用的标准和收取办法、维修资金的使用、服务用房的管理和使用、服务期限、服务交接等条款。”《物业管理条例》第三十五条第一款:“物业服务企业应当按照物业服务合同的约定,提供相应的服务。”
(1)应当注意的是,这种兼职并不是实在的职务安排,而是在联动语境下形成的一种以协商议事为目标的、松散的、非正式的工作形式。
(1)在私下的非正式场合,H公司J经理隐晦地表示:“反正嘛这些东西,你晓得,给别人做嫁衣。有的时候不要说(这些工作是)你的(还是)我的,提都不要提。”(访谈资料:E01-20210329)
(1)虽然根据法律法规,业主与物业公司之间仅存在物业服务合同关系,业主作为物业服务购买方有权自主更换物业服务提供者,但在实际生活中,业委会、业主大会试图提出此类动议或表决通过此类决议,都需要事先征求居委会的意见,至少是提前告知居委会并征得其不反对的态度。居委会、街道办事处实质性地介入变更物业服务企业事项可能存在多种考量,落实属地责任、维护辖区稳定就是其中之一。
基本信息:
中图分类号:F299.233.47;D267;D669.3
引用信息:
[1]宋维志.党建引领社区治理的制度逻辑与运行边界——以“红色物业”为例[J].公共管理评论,2023,5(04):5-24.
基金信息:
江西省哲学社会科学重点研究基地项目“数字社会背景下基层社区治理法治路径研究”(项目批准号:22SKJD02)资助
2023-12-13
2023-12-13
2023-12-13