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住宅专项维修资金是城市房屋共用部分长期维护的“养老金”,但是未能有效发挥其预期效能。研究发现,住宅专项维修资金管理各主体在实践中形塑了以业主为委托人的多重委托代理关系,且遵循各自不同的行动逻辑。业主作为委托人在委托权碎片化背景下遵循自利逻辑;政府在弱监管能力下呈现追求“安全合规”的“避责”逻辑;工程主体在弱监管环境下趋向与具有双重角色身份的物业公司和业委会共谋“逐利”。多元主体的行动逻辑共同形塑了实践中的业主合作困境、政府监管困境及代理人失控困境等多重困境。提高业主组织化水平、推动政府积极履责并提高其针对市场主体的专业监管能力,是破解多重困境、提升资金运作绩效的可行路径。
Abstract:The Housing Special Maintenance Fund serves as a “pension” for the long-term maintenance of common parts of urban residential buildings. However, in practice, issues such as low efficiency in application and utilization, as well as subpar engineering quality, are widespread. From the perspective of multiple principal-agent theory, this study takes the management and operations practices of the Housing Special Maintenance Fund in District J of City N as a typical case to investigate why the Housing Special Maintenance Fund system fails to function as intended in practice. The research finds that various actors in the management of the Housing Special Maintenance Fund have formed multiple principal-agent relationships with homeowners as the principal. These diverse actors follow different logics of action: As the principal, homeowners operate under a self-interested logic amidst fragmented delegation rights, and they face adverse selection due to information asymmetries. The government, driven by political requirements, assumes strong agent responsibilities but exhibits a “blame-avoidance” logic that prioritizes “safety and compliance” under weak regulatory capacity. Engineering actors, in the loosely regulated environment, tend to collude with property management companies and homeowners' committees—both of which assume dual roles—in pursuit of profits, leading to moral hazard and other agent problems. The interplay of these logics shapes multiple dilemmas in the management of the Housing Special Maintenance Fund, including homeowner collaboration challenges, government regulatory difficulties, and loss of control over agents. Enhancing the organizational level of homeowners, promoting active government accountability, and strengthening professional regulatory capacity over market actors are identified as feasible pathways to address these multifaceted dilemmas and to improve the operational performance of the Housing Special Maintenance Fund.
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(1)施工单位即所谓的“施工队”,负责具体的维修施工工程;监理单位一般维修工程申请金额达到20万以上才需要,对施工的“进度、安全、质量”等工程三要素进行监督;审价单位负责对施工方出具的工程造价等进行合理性审查。
(2)根据N市《物业管理条例》的规定,紧急情况主要包括:(一)电梯故障;(二)消防设施故障;(三)屋面、外墙渗漏;(四)二次供水水泵运行中断,但专业经营单位负责二次供水水泵设备维修、养护的除外;(五)专用排水设施因坍塌、堵塞、爆裂等造成功能障碍;(六)楼顶、楼体外立面存在脱落隐患;(七)其他危及房屋安全和人身财产安全的紧急情况。
(3)这里统计的相关业主申请使用的总数中,除了少数是无物业小区业主自行申请外,绝大部分都是业主全权委托物业公司代为申请,但是在管理部门的统计中属于业主申请。
(4)详见《住宅专项维修资金管理办法》第二章,第十条。
(5)详见《住宅专项维修资金管理办法》第二章,第十五条。
(6)作者根据N市J区住建中心2021—2023年数据统计。
(7)目标函数是委托-代理理论中的一个常见概念,指的是数学模型中对委托人或代理人所追求目标的数学描述,反映了他们各自的利益和偏好。
(8)根据访谈的情况,住宅专项维修资金项目的审价费用是阶梯收费,分为800元、2000元、2500元、3000元这四个级别,即便是最高等级的审价费用,也不足以支撑深入细致的实地审计。
基本信息:
中图分类号:F299.23
引用信息:
[1]钱坤.房屋共用部分“养老金”为何难养老?——基于N市J区的田野调查[J].公共管理评论,2025,7(04):200-213.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金项目“社区微更新视野下基层协商民主的共识困境与长效机制研究”(项目批准号:21BZZ109)的资助
2025-10-28
2025-10-28
2025-10-28