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本文采取混合研究方法对行政数据归集绩效考核开展研究,提出了一个负向激励模型——脱底锦标赛,以解释政府组织内广泛存在的惩罚型排名考核的激励效果和作用机制。定量研究发现,相比排名靠前的参赛者,排名靠后的参赛者受惩罚型排名考核的激励效果更强:被考核者本次排名越靠后,下一次考核中绩效改善幅度越大,呈现出“脱底”竞争现象。笔者通过对A省的案例研究进一步揭示了惩罚型排名考核的作用机制:(1)中央政府对排名底部省份的问责惩罚引发了地方领导对考核事项的注意力提升,促使省级职能部门采取运动式执行的方式快速建立工作机制、提高资源投入,从而改善了排名底部省份的绩效;(2)当地方绩效排名脱离底部位置后,随着地方执行部门的问责预期减弱且缺乏正向激励,地方领导对考核事项的注意力减弱,地方执行部门以流程再造的方式将行政数据归集报送工作分解、融入原有常规工作,以减少对本部门资源的占用。脱底锦标赛是对避责理论和政治锦标赛理论的有益结合,拓展了政治锦标赛模型在负向激励领域的应用边界,同时丰富了官员避责行为在表现形式和产生机制方面的研究。
Abstract：Drawing on the National Development and Reform Commission's monthly ranking bulletins on provincial administrative data consolidation and reporting,this study examines whether—and how—punitive rank-order assessments motivate the assessed organizations.We introduce a negative-incentive model of an off-the-bottom tournament,arguing that under public naming and accountability sanctions,participants do not race to the top but concentrate selective effort on escaping the bottom segment.This perspective helps explain rising compliance,declining late reporting,and a narrowing dispersion of performance distributions.We ask:(ⅰ) whether the incentive effect is structurally stronger for lower-ranked units;and(ⅱ) through what mechanisms punitive ranking shapes "escape-the-bottom" behavior.Methodologically,we adopt a mixed-methods design.The quantitative component uses monthly bulletins covering 31 provincial-level units from January 2021 to December2023;because the dependent variables are defined as month-to-month changes in performance,the regression sample spans February 2021 to December 2023.Two-way fixed-effects models with province and month fixed effects are estimated,controlling for data volume and spot-check-verified misreporting rates,with robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level.To assess whether the observed effect is merely driven by greater room for improvement among initially low-performing provinces,we further examine provincial self-ranking data from 2020,when no public ranking and bottom accountability pressure existed,thereby helping to rule out the alternative explanation of greater room for improvement.The qualitative component focuses on Province A and combines policy documents,internal materials,and in-depth interviews to trace the causal process through which punitive ranking generates organizational response.The findings are threefold.First,provinces located in the bottom segment in the previous round exhibit significant improvement in the subsequent round:increases in compliance and reductions in late reporting are systematically greater than for other provinces,supporting the hypothesis that punitive ranking strongly motivates bottom units to improve.Second,the incentive is distinctly structural:effects exhibit a "the lower,the harder" pattern consistent with an escape-the-bottom logic.Third,the mechanism analysis shows that once a province exits the bottom,weakened accountability expectations and the absence of positive rewards reduce leaders' attention.The influence of punitive ranking follows a two-stage dynamic:when at the bottom,concentrated effort and process redesign("escape stage");after escaping,a return to routine with attenuated attention and resources but continued operation of the newly embedded processes("routine stage"),explaining the observed pattern of selective effort.The contribution of this study is threefold.Empirically,it provides evidence that punitive rank-order assessments can improve performance,but that such improvement is concentrated among actors facing bottom-of-the-table pressure.Theoretically,it extends tournament theory from promotion-oriented positive incentives to accountability-oriented negative incentives and develops the concept of the off-the-bottom tournament as an analytical framework for understanding selective effort under punitive assessment.More broadly,it links this framework to blame-avoidance theory,thereby enriching research on the micro-level mechanisms of avoidance behavior in government performance management.
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(1)美国心理学家Skinner(1953)提出,激励可分为奖励型的正向激励与惩罚型的负向激励两种类型。
(2)参见《国务院办公厅关于运用大数据加强对市场主体服务和监管的若干意见》(国办发[2015]51号)。
(3)迟报率计算方式是迟报数据量除以全部上报数据量,行政信息公示日超过决定日二十个工作日算作迟报数据;合规率计算方式是入库数据量除以上报数据量,上报数据需要符合报送系统的数据归集校验规则才能入库。“平均数”是使用各省份算术平均值计算的。数据来源于国家发展改革委发给各省的数据归集报送考核情况通报。
基本信息:
中图分类号:D630;D922.1
引用信息:
[1]陈启博,曹海军.脱底锦标赛:惩罚型排名考核下的“脱底”竞争[J].公共管理评论().
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金重点项目“差序格局下市域社会治理现代化的纵向协同机制创新研究”(项目批准号:23AZZ005)的资助
2026-07-21
2026-07-21
2026-07-21