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近年来,中国绿色发展理念的深入贯彻与中央政府问责力度的持续加大,倒逼地方政府将更多注意力分配给环境保护议题。那么,地方政府的环境注意力越高,其环境政策执行力就越强吗?基于压力型体制和注意力基础观,本文以259个中国地级行政区2011—2018年的面板数据为样本,实证分析了地方政府环境注意力对环境政策执行力的影响。研究结果表明,地方政府环境注意力与环境政策执行力之间呈倒U形关系。地方政府环境注意力提高了地方政府领导对生态环境治理的理解程度,然而,当压力型体制下的环境注意力分配超过地方政府的现实条件和实际能力时却会诱发地方政府的避责行为,形式上完成政策目标的行为导致了政策执行力的下降。已有研究对于政府环境注意力的测量缺少科学有效的方式,本文采用文本分析和机器学习技术构建出政府环境注意力指标,实证检验了地方政府环境注意力影响环境政策执行力的逻辑,弥补了已有研究较少从量化分析入手研究政府注意力对政策执行力影响的不足,为有效分配政府注意力资源提供了实证证据。
Abstract：Local governments face a variety of challenges, such as advanced economic development, the ensuring of living standards, the safeguarding of social stability, and promotion of environmental improvements. To overcome these challenges, the central government may offer incentives to attract the attention of local governments. Although distributing the attention of local governments may be costly, the potential benefits it offers to the environment have resulted in policy implementation. Previous work on the attention of governments investigates the competition surrounding attention. Research also shows that while there may be some symbolic implementation, it is often less than the central government expects. Absent from this discussion, however, has been any work on the attention of local governments to environmental policy implementation.Recently, local governments have faced increasing green development and central government accountability pressures, which means that local governments are allocating more attention to environmental protection. What is the relationship between the attention of local governments and policy implementation? Does greater local government environmental attention improve the execution of environmental policies? Based on a pressurized system and an attention-based view of the Chinese government, this research uses panel data of 259 Chinese prefectural-level administrative regions from 2010 to 2018 to explain the relationship between the allocation of environmental attention and environmental policy enforcement. The results show that environmental policy implementation follows an inverted U-shaped pattern as local governmental environmental attention increases. Moderate local government environmental attention can significantly improve the implementation of environmental policies. At the same time, excessive attention will contribute to an avoidance of responsibility under a pressurized system, and symbolic implementation will lead to a decline in policy implementation.Moreover, while environmental attention may increase, it is important to note that the logic of appropriateness in decision-making may have a large impact on implementation.This has important implications for the central government when considering the use of moderate incentives, particularly when there are accountability stresses. While environmental attention may lead to decision-making on policy implementation, it comes with a high cost to the quality of the attention of local governments. Existing research lacks a scientific and effective way to measure local government environmental attention. This article uses textual analysis and machine-learning technology to measure the local governments' environmental attention. Meanwhile, this article contributes to work on the relationship between environmental attention and local government policy implementation based on a quantitative analysis of attention resources. It provides empirical evidence and suggestions based on environmental policy.To continue to improve our understanding of local government behavior and the impact of environmental attention on policy implementation, additional work is necessary.First, through case studies that focus on the logic of local government leaders' decisionmaking, we can understand the Chinese political context that influences decisions on policy implementation or symbolic implementation. Second, in-depth research into the impact of situational factors on the relationship between local governments' environmental attention and policy implementation may provide clarity on the reasons for local government behavior. Third, this can lead to an improved ability to measure local governmental attention, such as to provide measurements of the leaders' instructions, inspections, and other environmental activities.
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(1)吉林省公布了“十二五”期间每年的减排目标。
(1)感谢匿名审稿人和编辑部的意见。
(1)感谢编辑部的意见。
(1)此处假设:地方政府领导是有限理性的政治人,他们有实现政绩的动机。
(1)编辑部和匿名审稿人对实际执行和形式主义之间的关系还存在疑问。作者认为,地方政府在政策执行中有多重决策逻辑,领导重视下不同决策逻辑之间的关系还需要案例研究进一步补充说明。作者接下来的研究方向:通过单案例研究建构地方政府领导重视下的环境政策执行行为的转换模型。
基本信息:
中图分类号:D630;X32
引用信息:
[1]张坤鑫.地方政府注意力与环境政策执行力的倒U形关系研究[J].公共管理评论,2021,3(04):132-161.