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东西部协作是国家统筹区域协调发展、扎实推进共同富裕的核心制度安排,产业协作作为其中的关键抓手,肩负着培育西部受扶地内生发展动能、实现区域产业协同升级的重要使命,却在实践中陷入产业项目“造血难、可持续性弱”的现实困境。本文以东西部产业协作为研究对象,深度剖析基层政府策略性选择行为的表征、影响与形成机理。研究发现,在时间、资源与绩效三重制度约束下,东部帮扶方与西部受扶方形成了以弹性切入、借势共存、拼接整合为核心表征的策略性选择行为,三类行为分别对应完成任务、降低风险、打造亮点的基层治理逻辑。研究进一步揭示,策略性选择行为的生成并非孤立的基层应对,而是纵向央地博弈与横向府际共谋的结果。央地之间围绕剩余控制权展开的全链条博弈,从制度源头上为策略性选择塑造了行动空间与诱因;而东西部帮扶双方基于差异化利益算计形成的横向府际共谋,则成为策略性选择行为落地与维持的核心实践机制,二者共同构成“制度约束—基层行为”的传导逻辑。本文从府际互动与行为策略双重视角,阐释东西部产业协作难以实现造血赋能的深层原因,为优化东西部协作制度设计、完善长效帮扶机制、推动产业高质量协作提供理论参考与实践启示。
Abstract：East-West collaboration is a core institutional arrangement for the state to coordinate balanced regional development and substantially advance common prosperity. Industrial cooperation,as a key lever within this framework,carries the important mission of cultivating endogenous development momentum in western recipient regions and achieving synergistic industrial upgrading across regions,yet in practice it has fallen into the predicament that industrial projects struggle to become self-sustaining and lack longterm viability. This paper takes East-West industrial cooperation as its research subject,conducting an in-depth analysis of the manifestations,impacts,and formation mechanisms of strategic selection behaviors by grassroots governments. The study finds that,under the triple institutional constraints of time,resources,and performance,eastern assisting parties and western recipient parties have developed three types of strategic selection behavior characterized by speculative selection,parasitic dependency,and patchwork integration. These three types correspond, respectively, to grassroots rationales of fulfilling tasks,mitigating risks,and creating showcases,yet in essence they constitute a deviation from the long-term development goals of industrial cooperation. The research further reveals that the emergence of strategic selection behaviors is not an isolated grassroots response but rather the structural coupling of vertical central-local bargaining and horizontal intergovernmental collusion: the full-chain bargaining between central and local governments over residual control rights shapes, at the institutional source, the action space and incentives for strategic selection; meanwhile,the horizontal intergovernmental collusion formed between eastern and western partners on the basis of differentiated interest calculations serves as the core practical mechanism through which strategic selection behaviors are implemented and sustained. Together,these two dimensions constitute the key transmission logic from “institutional constraints to grassroots behavior. ” By examining the dual perspectives of intergovernmental interaction and behavioral strategy,this paper elucidates the deep-seated reasons why East-West industrial cooperation struggles to build self-sustaining capacity,offering theoretical reference and practical insights for optimizing the institutional design of East-West collaboration, improving long-term assistance mechanisms, and steering industrial cooperation back toward high-quality development.
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(1)中国政府网:《中共中央国务院关于进一步深化农村改革扎实推进乡村全面振兴的意见》,2019年3月26日,https://www. gov. cn/zhengce/202502/content_7005158. htm,2025年2月13日访问。
(1)中央虽不规定帮扶地向受扶地投入的协作资金底数,但要求每年东西部协作协议中的财政援助资金额不少于上一年度,由于资金数额易于量化,协作资金底数增长这一政策目标是清晰的。
(1)东西部协作项目执行“双签双审批双监管”制度,根据“三上三下”的审批要求,立项时间需要2~3个月,个别增加项目后方单位审批的地区,耗时可长达4~5个月甚至更久。再加上每年“两会”后3月底项目资金才到位,到位后才能推进项目方案审批会、项目财政预算评审、项目施工招投标三个环节,各环节平均耗时约一个月。也就是说,大部分项目在当年5—6月才正式实施,部分延至7—8月份甚至更晚,但需在7月底、9月底、11月底分别完成50%、75%和90%的进度和支付率,并在12月底考核前通过验收,否则考核时会被认为不达标。
(1)在项目立项阶段,项目遴选涉及三个环节,即“村申报—镇审核—县审定”。“村申报”与“镇审核”中涉及的项目选择、项目主体资格审查等实质运作过程一般在项目谋划阶段完成,镇政府仅在立项程序启动时将审核通过的项目按流程上报至县级行业主管部门。项目立项阶段的核心环节为“县审定”,该环节又细分为三个环节,即审定材料上交、东西部协作领导小组审定、正式立项批复文件下达环节。在“县审定”环节,帮扶双方的协作干部、项目申报主体、项目所涉的职能部门会对项目的可行性与预期绩效反复评估,三方难以达成共识的项目往往被淘汰。而在项目立项后、实施前的准备阶段,项目仍需通过方案审批会、财政项目预算评审才能开展招投标流程。项目实施前的所有流程约需4个月。
基本信息:
中图分类号:F124
引用信息:
[1]谢治菊,许文睿.东西部产业协作中的策略性选择行为及其形成机理[J].公共管理评论().
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金重大项目“防止规模性返贫的监测机制和帮扶路径研究”(项目批准号:22&ZD192); 广东省哲学社会科学规划项目“东西部产业协作的价值共创机理与治理策略研究”(项目批准号:GD23XGL067);广东省哲学社会科学规划项目“东西部产业协作促进共同富裕的逻辑与路径研究”(项目批准号:GD25YGG03)的资助
2026-07-22
2026-07-22
2026-07-22