冯国强

• 1:兰州大学经济学院

摘要(Abstract)：

增长目标引领是中国经济运行的重要特征，实践中地方政府又会如何根据增长目标来分配政策注意力，以此化解多任务之间的冲突?通过对政府工作报告的文本挖掘，本研究从环保注意力分配的角度来回答上述问题。研究发现：地方政府面临的增长目标压力越大，政府工作报告中体现的环保关注度越低；这种目标压力包括挖掘辖区增长潜力的压力和完成上级分解目标的压力，其中第一类压力对环保注意力分配的抑制作用是第二类的1.5倍；晋升激励较低的官员会稀释第二类目标压力的抑制作用，表现为比其他官员更加关注环境保护；相比市委书记，市长更容易强化第一类目标压力对环境关注的抑制作用。进一步研究发现，党代会召开当年和之后两年，地方官员倾向于降低环境关注，并且注意力分配对环保监管、投资的作用不明显，但关注环境对官员尤其市长的职业生涯有积极影响。本研究的政策启示是，针对收益周期长、缺乏立竿见影效果的任务，过程考核比结果考核更重要；提高政策注意力分配实质性的治理效果，需要以缓和多任务间的目标冲突为前提。

关键词(KeyWords)： 目标管理;增长压力;晋升激励;环境保护;注意力分配

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金青年项目“环保部约谈对邻居城市的治理效应：以空气污染治理为例”(项目批准号:71903079);; 甘肃省软科学专项项目“甘肃省县域制度质量提升与经济增长动能转换模式研究”(项目批准号:20CX4ZA035)的资助

作者(Author): 冯国强

参考文献(References)：

• 陈科霖，谷志军.2022.多元政绩竞赛：中国地方官员晋升的新解释[J].政治学研究，(1):117-128.Chen K L,Gu Z J.2022,Pluralistic political achievements competition:A new explanation for promotion of Chinese local cadres[J].CASS Journal of Political Science,(1):117-128.(in Chinese)
• 陈诗一，陈登科.2018.雾霾污染、政府治理与经济高质量发展[J].经济研究，53(2):20-34.Chen S Y,Chen D K.2018.Air pollution,government regulations and high-quality economic development[J].Economic Research Journal,53(2):20-34.(in Chinese)
• 程华，樊沁怡，龚强.2023.地方政府环境关注度、媒体监督和国有企业减排绩效[J].经济科学，(5):183-198.Cheng H,Fan Q Y,Gong Q.2023.Local governments' environmental attention,media supervision,and environmental performance of state-owned enterprises[J].Economic Science,(5):183-198.(in Chinese)
• 黄亮雄，王贤彬，刘淑琳.2021.经济增长目标与激进城镇化——来自夜间灯光数据的证据[J].世界经济，44(6):97-122.Huang L X,Wang X B,Liu S L.2021.Economic growth target and radical urbanisation:Evidence from satellite night-light data[J].The Journal of World Economy,44(6):97-122.(in Chinese)
• 李辉.2022.层层加码：反制科层组织执行衰减的一种策略[J].中国行政管理，(4):89-94.Li H.2022.Add code layer by layer:A strategy to counter the implement decay of bureaucratic execution[J].Chinese Public Administration,(4):89-94.(in Chinese)
• 李书娟，陈邱惠，徐现祥.2021.不利冲击下经济增长恢复的经验——基于中国经济目标管理实践[J].经济研究，56(7):59-77.Li S J,Chen Q H,Xu X X.2021.The experience of economic growth recovery under adverse shocks:Based on the practice of China's economic growth target management[J].Economic Research Journal,56(7):59-77.(in Chinese)
• 李书娟，徐现祥.2021.目标引领增长[J].经济学(季刊),21(5):1571-1590.Li S J,Xu X X.2021.Target drives growth[J].China Economic Quarterly,21(5):1571-1590.(in Chinese)
• 黎文靖，汪顺，陈黄悦.2020.平衡的发展目标与不平衡的发展——增长目标偏离与企业创新[J].管理世界，36(12):162-175.Li W J,Wang S,Chen H Y.2020.Balanced development target and unbalanced development:GDP target deviation and corporate innovation[J].Journal of Management World,36(12):162-175.(in Chinese)
• 练宏.2016.注意力竞争——基于参与观察与多案例的组织学分析[J].社会学研究，31(4):1-26.Lian H.2016.Constructing the Chinese governance system:History and reality competing for attention in the Chinese bureaucracy[J].Sociological Studies,31(4):1-26.(in Chinese)
• 刘景江，王文星.2014.管理者注意力研究：一个最新综述[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),44(2):78-87.Liu J J,Wang W X.2014.Research on managerial attention:A state of the art review[J].Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Sciences),44(2):78-87.(in Chinese)
• 沈坤荣，金刚，方娴.2017.环境规制引起了污染就近转移吗?[J].经济研究，52(5):44-59.Shen K R,Jin G,Fang X.2017.Does environmental regulation cause pollution to transfer nearby?[J].Economic Research Journal,52(5):44-59.(in Chinese)
• 孙雨.2019.中国地方政府“注意力强化”现象的解释框架——基于S省N市环保任务的分析[J].北京社会科学，(11):41-50.Sun Y.2019.An explanatory framework of ‘attention increase’ in Chinese local governments—A case study for environmental protection task[J].Social Sciences of Beijing,(11):41-50.(in Chinese)
• 陶鹏，初春.2022.领导注意力的传播效应：党政结构视角及环保议题实证[J].公共管理学报，19(1):72-83.Tao P,Chu C.2022.Intergovernmental structure and communication effect of political attention:Based on perspective of party and government structure and China's empirical research[J].Journal of Public Management,19(1):72-83.(in Chinese)
• 滕祥河，文传浩.2018.政府生态环境治理意志向度词频的引致效应研究[J].软科学，32(6):34-38.Teng X H,Wen C H.2018.Research on effect of word frequency of government intention on eco-environment management[J].Soft Science,32(6):34-38.(in Chinese)
• 王汉生，王一鸽.2009.目标管理责任制：农村基层政权的实践逻辑[J].社会学研究，24(2):61-92.Wang H S,Wang Y G.2009.Target management responsibility system:The practical logic of local party-state in rural China[J].Sociological Studies,24(2):61-92.(in Chinese)
• 王杰，刘斌.2014.环境规制与企业全要素生产率——基于中国工业企业数据的经验分析[J].中国工业经济，(3):44-56.Wang J,Liu B.2014.Environmental regulation and enterprises' TFP—An empirical analysis based on China's industrial enterprises data[J].China Industrial Economics,(3):44-56.(in Chinese)
• 王贤彬，徐现祥.2008.地方官员来源、去向、任期与经济增长——来自中国省长省委书记的证据[J].管理世界，(3):16-26.Wang X B,Xu X X.2008.Source,destination,tenure,and economic growth of local officials:Evidence from Chinese provincial governors and party secretaries[J].Journal of Management World,(3):16-26.(in Chinese)
• 王贤彬，陈春秀.2019.经济增长目标压力遏制制造业全要素生产率提升了吗?[J].产经评论，10(6):108-122.Wang X B,Chen C X.2019.Does the pressure of economic growth hinder the improvement of total factor productivity in manufacturing?[J].Industrial Economic Review,10(6):108-122.(in Chinese)
• 王印红，李萌竹.2017.地方政府生态环境治理注意力研究——基于30个省市政府工作报告(2006—2015)文本分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境，27(2):28-35.Wang Y H,Li M Z.2017.Study on local government attention of ecological environment governance:Based on the text analysis of government work report in 30 provinces and cities (2006—2015)[J].China Population,Resources and Environment,27(2):28-35.(in Chinese)
• 文宏，杜菲菲.2018.注意力、政策动机与政策行为的演进逻辑——基于中央政府环境保护政策进程(2008—2015年)的考察[J].行政论坛，25(2):80-87.Wen H,Du F F.2018.The evolution logic of attention,policy motivation and policy behavior—Based on the inspection of process of central government's environmental protection policy from 2008 to 2015[J].Administrative Tribune,25(2):80-87.(in Chinese)
• 吴兴河.2022.环境领导力的缘起、挑战与制度调适[J].领导科学，(2):123-127.Wu X H.2022.Origins,challenges and institutional adaptation of environmental leadership[J].Leadership Science,(2):123-127.(in Chinese)
• 徐现祥，刘毓芸.2017.经济增长目标管理[J].经济研究，52(7):18-33.Xu X X,Liu Y Y.2017.Economic growth target management[J].Economic Research Journal,52(7):18-33.(in Chinese)
• 杨其静，郑楠.2013.地方领导晋升竞争是标尺赛、锦标赛还是资格赛?[J].世界经济，36(12):130-156.Yang Q J,Zheng N.2013.Is the competition for promotion of local leaders a benchmark competition,tournament,or qualification competition?[J].The Journal of World Economy,36(12):130-156.(in Chinese)
• 姚洋，张牧扬.2013.官员绩效与晋升锦标赛——来自城市数据的证据[J].经济研究，48(1):137-150.Yao Y,Zhang M Y.2013.Performance of officials and the promotion tournament—Evidence from Chinese cities[J].Economic Research Journal,48(1):137-150.(in Chinese)
• 叶邦银，徐怀宁，李辛熠.2023.政府环境审计、注意力配置与国有企业绿色创新质量[J].审计与经济研究，38(3):1-10.Ye B Y,Xu H N,Li X Y.2023.Government environmental audit,attention allocation and green innovation quality of state-owned enterprises[J].Journal of Audit & Economics,38(3):1-10.(in Chinese)
• 余泳泽，刘大勇，龚宇.2019.过犹不及事缓则圆：地方经济增长目标约束与全要素生产率[J].管理世界，35(7):26-42.Yu Y Z,Liu D Y,Gong Y.2019.Target of local economic growth and total factor productivity[J].Management World,35(7):26-42.(in Chinese)
• 余泳泽，孙鹏博，宣烨.2020.地方政府环境目标约束是否影响了产业转型升级?[J].经济研究，55(8):57-72.Yu Y Z,Sun P B,Xuan Y.2020.Do constraints on local governments' environmental targets affect industrial transformation and upgrading?[J].Economic Research Journal,55(8):57-72.(in Chinese)
• 曾润喜，朱利平.2021.晋升激励抑制了地方官员环境注意力分配水平吗?[J].公共管理与政策评论，10(2):45-61.Zeng R X,Zhu L P.2021.Does promotion incentive inhibit the level of environmental attention allocation of local leader?[J].Public Administration and Policy Review,10(2):45-61.(in Chinese)
• 张坤鑫.2021.地方政府注意力与环境政策执行力的倒U形关系研究[J].公共管理评论，3(4):132-161.Zhang K X.2021.An inverted u-shaped relationship between environmental attention and local government policy implementation[J].China Public Administration Review,3(4):132-161.(in Chinese)
• 张则行.2022.组织控制视角下纵向府际环境治理责任均配及其履行路径初探[J].中国行政管理，(3):50-57.Zhang Z X.2022.Preliminary study on the distribution and implementation of inter-governmental environmental governance responsibilities from the perspective of organizational control[J].Chinese Public Administration,(3):50-57.(in Chinese)
• 周黎安.2007.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究，(7):36-50.Zhou L A.2007.Governing China's local officials:An analysis of promotion tournament model[J].Economic Research Journal,(7):36-50.(in Chinese)
• 周黎安.2014.行政发包制[J].社会，34(6):1-38.Zhou L A.2014.Administrative subcontract[J].Chinese Journal of Sociology,34(6):1-38.(in Chinese)
• 周黎安，刘冲，厉行，等.2015.“层层加码”与官员激励[J].世界经济文汇，(1):1-15.Zhou L A,Liu C,Li X,et al.2015.Add code layer by layer and officials' incentive[J].World Economic Papers,(1):1-15.(in Chinese)
• 周雪光，练宏.2012.中国政府的治理模式：一个“控制权”理论[J].社会学研究，27(5):69-93.Zhu X G,Lian H.2012.Modes of governance in the Chinese bureaucracy:A “control rights” theory[J].Sociological Studies,27(5):69-93.(in Chinese)
• 朱平芳，张征宇，姜国麟.2011.FDI与环境规制：基于地方分权视角的实证研究[J].经济研究，46(6):133-145.Zhang P F,Zhang Z Y,Jiang G L.2011.Empirical study of the relationship between FDI and environmental regulation:An intergovernmental competition perspective[J].Economic Research Journal,46(6):133-145.(in Chinese)
• Chen J C,Chen X,Hou Q S,et al.2021.Haste doesn't bring success:Top-down amplification of economic growth targets and enterprise overcapacity[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,70:102059.
• Chen S W,Jia K.2023.How local governments prioritize multiple conflicting goals:Beyond the sole-goal perspective[J].Public Administration,101(2):522-538.
• Chen Y J,Li P,Lu Y.2018.Career concerns and multitasking local bureaucrats:Evidence of a target-based performance evaluation system in China[J].Journal of Development Economics,133:84-101.
• Jones B D.1994.Reconceiving decision-making in democratic politics:Attention,choice,and public policy[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,28-43.
• Jones B D,Baumgartner F R.2005.The politics of attention:How government prioritizes problems[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,73-80.
• Landry P F,Lü X B,Duan H Y.2018.Does performance matter?Evaluating political selection along the Chinese administrative ladder[J].Comparative Political Studies,51(8):1074-1105.
• Li X,Liu C,Weng X,et al.2019.Target setting in tournaments:Theory and evidence from China[J].The Economic Journal,129(623):2888-2915.
• Lieberthal K.2003.Governing China:From revolution through reform[M].2nd ed.New York:W.W.Norton & Company,40-53.
• Ocasio W.2011.Attention to attention[J].Organization Science,22(5):1286-1296.
• Simon H,March J,Simon H.2006.Administrative behavior and organizations[M]//Miner J B.Organizational Behavior 2:Essential Theories of Process and Structure.New York:Routledge,41-59.
• Simon H A.2013.Administrative behavior[M].4th ed.New York:Simon and Schuster,12-40.
• Stevens R,Moray N,Bruneel J,et al.2015.Attention allocation to multiple goals:The case of for-profit social enterprises[J].Strategic Management Journal,36(7):1006-1016.
• (1)需要说明的是,部分地级市在年底召开两会并发布政府工作报告,总结当年工作的同时布置下一年的目标任务。数据处理时按来年政府工作报告进行处理。
• (2)以普通地级市为例,市长调任市委书记、省会城市市长、省直属部门厅长和重要部门常务副职领导、副省长、省委副书记、副部长、副省级城市市长或市委书记,超过57岁之后进入地方人大、政协担任副省级干部、省长助理则定义为晋升;市委书记调任省委常委、副省长、省委副书记、副部长、副省级城市市长或市委书记、重要的省直部门正职,超过57岁之后进入省人大、省政协、副省级城市人大或政协的副省级岗位则定义为晋升。其中,重要部门常务副职包括省委组织部常务副部长、宣传部常务副部长、统战部常务副部长和省委常务副秘书长。这些部门的正职干部通常进入省委常委或由副省级干部兼任,属于副省级职位,其常务副职视为与普通地级市市委书记平级。重要的省直部门正职是指未能升级到副省级的重要岗位,包括省政府秘书长、省财政厅厅长、省发改委主任。