许珂,张芳文

• 1:西安财经大学公共管理学院
• 2:西北大学公共管理学院

摘要(Abstract)：

研究基层官员避责行为的产生机理有助于完善我国官员激励机制，激发干部积极履职、敢于担当的意识。既有研究多集中于对危机情境中基层官员的避责行为进行探究，依托危机事件采取案例分析等质性研究方法，但忽视或未实证检验感知问责作为心理机制的中介作用。基于此，本文从目标责任考核这一日常治理情境出发，以计划行为理论和目标设置理论为基础，以基层官员为研究对象，发现目标设置合理性对避责行为存在显著的负向影响。其中，感知问责在目标合理性与避责行为之间存在中介作用；权责匹配在目标合理性与感知问责之间起正向调节作用，在感知问责与避责行为之间起负向调节作用。由此，本文建构了目标责任制下基层官员避责行为的解释性框架，认为基层官员避责行为实质上是在特定目标设置与资源匹配下基于心理感知的一种主动性调适，是对目标任务的一种消极反馈。该框架可能会对抑制和矫治基层官员避责行为具有一定启示意义。

关键词(KeyWords)： 目标责任制;权责关系;避责行为;感知问责;计划行为理论

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家社会科学基金一般项目“西部贫困地区县级地方政府治理能力评估研究”(项目批准号:19BZZ064);; 西北大学研究生科研创新项目“生态环境治理合作生产中公共价值冲突及干预研究”(项目批准号:CX2023021)资助

作者(Author): 许珂,张芳文

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