肖汉宇,涂文燕

• 1:the Department of Public Policy at the City University of Hong Kong

摘要(Abstract)：

This article introduces four of the latest,high-quality papers published in China's top journals. The first article is an in-depth discussion of"government as a platform"contributing to an emerging and timely discussion of digital government in the public management literature. By employing the theory of "loose coupling " from organizational institutionalism,the second study introduces a new theoretical concept,that is, a "security zone for achievement " to synthesize the seemingly contradictory propositions derived from credit claiming and blame avoidance, based on a city 's trajectory in a Smart City project. The third paper proposes a theoretical alternative,prioritizing the Party committee's assigned tasks,to supplement the existing explanations of local governance in China as applied to water treatment in provincial China. Such a mechanism is different from the campaign-style governance model because the Party committee plays a key role in providing substantial institutional incentives. The final paper conceptualizes institutional frictions in the Chinese context and explains different spending patterns across functional expenditures at the provincial level,suggesting a local leader's tenure may influence target selections for punctuated expenditures. The paper concludes with a brief summary.

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基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author): 肖汉宇,涂文燕

参考文献(References)：

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• (1)Yao et al.(2020)is a quantitative paper. Although the study by Gao and Cai(2020)uses some purposive survey data from government officials,its main evidence is from their in-depth interviews with local government officials and secondary data. Nevertheless,we do not argue that this trend is representative in Chinese public management studies.
• (2)For example,Song Kaiye who wrote the government platform paper is currently a PhD candidate at Sun Yat-sen University.