黄扬

• 1:中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院

摘要(Abstract)：

实践表明，随着运动式监管的重复上演，其治理成效可能随着监管双方的持续互动而由强渐弱，但既有研究对治理链条的末端互动和治理绩效的渐进演变着墨较少。本文将历时性的分析视角带入监管链条末端，结合校外培训监管实践，清晰呈现监管双方互动与运动式监管失灵之间的逻辑联系：当上级初次围绕某一议题或政策发生重大调整的领域发起运动式监管时，慑于自上而下的压力信号和囿于上级督查的信息不明，基层监管部门通常会高标准地推进治理，而监管对象一时间也很难把握“合规的边界”,因而更倾向于积极配合或暂停营业；但随着治理转回常规，为平衡合规程度和成本控制之间的张力，监管对象会在底线合规逻辑的驱动下开始“试探性违规”。同时，面对任务膨胀与资源约束二者之间的持续张力，基层监管部门会遵循自我减负的行动逻辑，对“试探性违规”采取有的放矢的“选择性容忍”;随着运动式监管的重复上演，监管双方也将通过多次的“试探性违规”和“选择性容忍”逐渐就“合规的边界”达成默契，进而导致运动式监管走向失灵。

关键词(KeyWords)： 政府监管;运动式治理;选择性执法;“双减”

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家社会科学基金重点项目“基于数据赋能的基层社会治理现代化研究”(项目批准号:20AZD088)资助

作者(Author): 黄扬

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• (1)根据国务院办公厅《关于规范校外培训机构发展的意见》,校外培训机构必须证照齐全方可招生办学,证照指办学许可证和营业执照(或民办非企业单位登记证书),发证机构分别为教育行政部门、市场监管部门和民政部门。同时,从事学科类知识培训的教师应持有教师资格证。
• (2)此处“合规的边界”中的“合规”是指监管对象的具体经营行为(无论合规与否)在监管实践中会被查处的概率或风险很低,即处在基层监管部门所能接受的范围之内,但这并不意味着经营行为严格遵循了有关的规章制度(实质性合规)。
• (3)根据《“双减”意见》,对现有学科类校外培训机构全部重新审核,并加以压减,压减的选项包括“营转非”(营利性学科类机构到民政局转登为非营利机构,实行政府指导价)、“学转非”(学科类机构转型为非学科类机构)和终止办学。
• (4)此处的“新生领域”不仅指此前从未有过相应监管政策或监管部门的领域,也包括在监管政策发生某次重大调整前,监管部门并未对其采取实质性监管措施的领域。另外,在某些此前虽采取过实质性监管措施但监管政策发生了重大调整的领域,监管双方的政策认知也可能随着监管政策的重大调整而出现模糊,进而引发本文所关注的现象。
• (5)“历时性的分析视角”援引自史蒂芬·巴利(Barley,1986)关于技术与组织相互建构的研究。其研究运用历时性的分析视角,对技术与组织(结构)之间的复杂互动过程进行了生动呈现。该分析视角使读者能直观感受技术对组织的影响并非是在一次性的简单互动中达成的,而是处于一个时间流中,经由技术与组织二者的反复互动才最终形成。
• (6)本文所称的“选择性容忍”本质上也属于选择性执法,之所以将监管部门的互动策略提炼为“选择性容忍”,主要出于以下考量:在监管双方的互动过程中,监管对象更为主动地采取“试探性违规”,而监管部门则是对已出现的违规行为做出后续回应,具有明显的被动色彩。“容忍”一词蕴含被动之意,有助于更为精准地刻画监管部门在互动策略上的被动性和回应性。
• (7)尽管本文对监管双方在各个阶段的互动策略进行了清晰划分,但这不意味着每一个阶段仅存在单一类型的互动策略。例如,在常规治理时期,面对目标群体的“试探性违规”,监管部门也可能会以“选择性容忍”做出回应。但在特定阶段中,某一类型的互动策略可能会更为突出。例如,在运动式治理阶段,受到任务压力的驱动,监管部门的执法活动相较于常规时期更为频繁,“选择性容忍”的现象也更为突出。
• (8)根据访谈对象类型和日期进行匿名处理,EB表示教育局工作人员、TI表示校外培训机构工作人员、TC表示中小学教师,字母后的两位数字为受访者序号,后续数字则为访谈日期。