周明星,王子成,刘慧婷

• 1:湖南农业大学公共管理与法学学院

摘要(Abstract)：

基于湖南省14个地级市的平衡面板数据,将提级调查政策实施视为一项准自然实验,运用广义差分模型评估提级调查对地方安全生产治理的影响效应,并利用调节效应模型考察官员腐败行为可能存在的调节作用。研究结果显示:提级调查对地方安全生产治理效果具有明显的促进效应,与未被提级调查的城市相比,政策实施城市的亿元GDP生产安全事故死亡率下降11.72%。在经过平行趋势检验、安慰剂检验、PSM-DID检验与政策唯一性检验后,该结论依旧成立。进一步拓展分析表明,官员腐败在提级调查对安全生产治理效果的影响中起到了负向调节作用,在一定程度上抑制了政策实施效果。本研究为创新安全生产政策法规和改善地方安全生产治理效果提供了借鉴。

关键词(KeyWords)： 提级调查;安全生产治理;腐败;双重差分;政策效果

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家社会科学基金重大项目“数字政府建设的安全治理体系研究”(项目批准号:20ZDA038)资助

作者(Author): 周明星,王子成,刘慧婷

参考文献(References)：

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• (1)该数据为作者通过整理应急管理部(原国家安监总局统计司)、国家统计局《国民经济和社会发展统计公报》中相关资料得到。 (1)该数据为作者通过整理应急管理部(原国家安监总局统计司)、国家统计局《国民经济和社会发展统计公报》中数据后计算得来。 (1)此部分法律文件主要通过“北大法宝”和网络资源搜集而来,比如《江西省生产安全事故提级调查与挂牌督办办法(试行)的通知》《四川省较大生产安全事故提级调查处理及挂牌督办办法》《陕西省较大生产安全事故提级调查处理办法》与吐鲁番市《一般生产安全事故挂牌督办及提级调查处理制度》等。 (1)近年来,我国政府在安全生产监管工作上逐步完善党政同责制度,亦有研究表明,党委领导在地方安全生产治理中发挥着关键作用,因此本文主要对市委书记的个人特征进行考察。 (1)由于文章篇幅,此处省略汇报相关性和多重共线性检验结果。