李洪涛,石宇

• 1:大连理工大学人文与社会科学学部

摘要(Abstract)：

基于高阶理论与晋升锦标赛理论,从专业背景、工作履历两个维度将官员主观偏好、个体行为逻辑与地方政府债务扩张纳入统一分析框架,探讨官员视角下地方政府债务扩张的内生机制。再将基于融资平台公司新名单的城投债数据库与手工整理核对的地方官员信息数据相匹配,建立面板数据模型,对官员专业背景、工作履历与地方政府债务扩张的影响关系展开实证检验。研究发现如下。第一,官员的专业背景、工作履历显著影响着地方政府债务扩张,并且这一影响主要体现于主动阶段(2009—2015年)的债务规模扩张。第二,理工科专业背景的官员更偏好实施债务扩张政策,特别是进行用于基建投资的城投债发行。第三,具备东中部地区工作履历的官员更倾向于债务扩张,处于厅级行政级别时调任西部地区的官员对地方政府债务扩张的影响更强。

关键词(KeyWords)： 地方政府债务扩张;官员专业背景;官员工作履历;晋升锦标赛;高阶理论

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家社会科学基金重大项目“新时代我国西部中心城市和城市群高质量协调发展战略研究”(项目批准号:20&ZD157)资助

作者(Author): 李洪涛,石宇

参考文献(References)：

• 曹婧,毛捷,薛熠.2019.城投债为何持续增长:基于新口径的实证分析[J].财贸经济,40(5):5-22.Cao J,Mao J,Xue Y.2019.Why do municipal investment bonds continue to grow?-An empirical analysis based on new statistical scope[J].Finance and Trade Economics,40(5):5-22.(in Chinese)
• 常晨,陆铭.2017.新城之殇---密度、距离与债务[J].经济学(季刊),16 (4):1621-1642.Chang C,Lu M.2017.Misery of new town-Density,distance and debt[J].China Economic Quarterly,16(4):1621-1642.(in Chinese)
• 陈思霞,周思艺,卢盛峰.2017.官员专业搭配与城市经济发展:“技能互补”还是“认知冲突”[J].经济学动态,(11):88-103.Chen S X,Zhou S Y,Lu S F.2017.Officials'professional collocation and urban economic development:“Complementary Skills”or“Cognitive Conflict”[J].Economic Perspectives,(11):88-103.(in Chinese)
• 郭玉清,薛琪琪,姜磊.2020.地方政府债务治理的演进逻辑与转型路径---兼论中国地方政府债务融资之谜[J].经济社会体制比较,(1):34-43.Guo Y Q,Xue Q Q,Jiang L.2020.The evolvement logic and transition path of local government debt governance:The mystery of China'local government debt financing[J].Comparative Economic and Social Systems,(1):34-43.(in Chinese)
• 韩健,程宇丹.2019.地方政府性债务影响经济增长路径的区域异质性分析[J].统计研究,36(3):32-41.Han J,Cheng Y D.2019.A study on regional heterogeneity in the impacts of local governmental debts on economic growth paths[J].Statistical Research,36(3):32-41.(in Chinese)
• 何杨,王蔚.2015.土地财政、官员特征与地方债务膨胀---来自中国省级市政投资的经验证据[J].中央财经大学学报,(6):10-19.He Y,Wang W.2015.Land public finance,official characteristics and local debt expansion:Empirical evidence from provincial infrastructure investment in China[J].Journal of Central University of Finance and Economics,(6):10-19.(in Chinese)
• 黄帅.2020.地方官员专业背景在应对新冠疫情冲击中的作用:基于企业业绩视角[J].南方经济,(8):33-48.Huang S.2020.The role of local officials'professional background in coping with the impact of the COVID-19 epidemic:Based on the perspective of enterprise performance[J].South China Journal of Economics,(8):33-48.(in Chinese)
• 李洪涛,王丽丽.2020.城市群协调发展的距离、分割与一体化[J].财经科学,(10):65-79.Li H T,Wang L L.2020.The distance,division and integration of coordinated development of urban agglomerations[J].Finance and Economics,(10):65-79.(in Chinese)
• 李树,许峻桦.2018.地方官员的专业背景与农村金融供给---基于西部XX市区(县)级官员的数据分析[J].金融经济学研究,33(5):95-104.Li S,Xu J H.2018.The relationship between the professional background of local officials and the supply of rural finance:Based on profile data analysis of XX district(County) officials in western China[J].Financial Economics Research,33(5):95-104.(in Chinese)
• 李升,陆琛怡.2020.地方政府债务风险的形成机理研究:基于显性债务和隐性债务的异质性分析[J].中央财经大学学报,(7):3-16,47.Li S,Lu C Y.2020.Formation mechanism of the risk of local government debt:A study based on the difference analysis of explicit debt and implicit debt[J].Journal of Central University of Finance and Economics,(7):3-16,47.(in Chinese)
• 李一花,张芳洁.2020.机会成本视野的地方政府举债逻辑及其风险防控研究[J].中央财经大学学报,(11):3-12.Li Y H,Zhang F J.2020.A study on the logic of local government borrowing from the perspective of opportunity cost and its risk prevention[J].Journal of Central University of Finance and Economics,(11):3-12.(in Chinese)
• 林蓉蓉.2019.人力资本如何影响官员晋升---基于1990~2013年省级领导晋升过程的研究[J].政治学研究,(1):91-105,128.Lin R R.2019.How human capital affects political upward mobility:Evidence of promotional trajectories of Chinese provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013[J].CASSJournal of Political Science,(1):91-105,128.(in Chinese)
• 龙志和,莫凡.2019.官员个人特征对地方政府债务的影响---以“泛珠三角”地级市党政正职为考察对象[J].软科学,33(7):139-144.Long Z H,Mo F.2019.The influence of public official personal characteristics on local government debt-Investigation on the pan-pearl river delta prefecture-level city party and government principals[J].Soft Science,33(7):139-144.(in Chinese)
• 陆铭.2017.城市、区域和国家发展---空间政治经济学的现在与未来[J].经济学(季刊),16(4):1499-1532.Lu M.2017.Urban,regional and national development:The present and future of spatial political economics[J].China Economic Quarterly,16(4):1499-1532.(in Chinese)
• 陆铭,李鹏飞,钟辉勇.2019.发展与平衡的新时代---新中国70年的空间政治经济学[J].管理世界,35(10):11-23,63,219.Lu M,Li P F,Zhong H Y.2019.The new era of development and balance:Spatial political economics of New China'regional economy for 70 years[J].Management World,35(10):11-23,63,219.(in Chinese)
• 罗党论,佘国满.2015.地方官员变更与地方债发行[J].经济研究,50(6):131-146.Luo D L,She G M.2015.Official'turnover and issuance of local government debt[J].Economic Research Journal,50(6):131-146.(in Chinese)
• 吕炜,周佳音,陆毅.2019.理解央地财政博弈的新视角---来自地方债发还方式改革的证据[J].中国社会科学,(10):134-159,206-207.Lv W,Zhou J Y,Lu Y.2019.A new perspective for understanding the central-local fiscal game-Evidence from reforms in the issuance and repayment modes of municipal bonds[J].Social Sciences in China,(10):134-159,206-207.(in Chinese)
• 马万里.2019.中国地方政府隐性债务扩张的行为逻辑---兼论规范地方政府举债行为的路径转换与对策建议[J].财政研究,(8):60-71,128.Ma W L.2019.Behavioral logic of China'local governments'implicit debt expansionAlso on the conversion of regulating local governments'borrowing behavior and suggestions[J].Public Finance Research,(8):60-71,128.(in Chinese)
• 毛捷,徐军伟.2019.中国地方政府债务问题研究的现实基础---制度变迁、统计方法与重要事实[J].财政研究,(1):3-23.Mao J,Xu J W.2019.Reality base of research on China'local government debtInstitutional transition,statistical methods and key facts[J].Public Finance Research,(1):3-23.(in Chinese)
• 毛文峰,陆军.2020.土地资源错配、城市蔓延与地方政府债务---基于新口径城投债数据的经验证据[J].经济学家,(4):80-88.Mao W F,Lu J.2020.Land resource mismatch,urban sprawl and local government debt:Empirical evidence based on new-caliber urban investment debt data[J].Economist,(4):80-88.(in Chinese)
• 缪小林,赵一心.2019.地方债对地区全要素生产率增长的影响---基于不同财政独立性的分组考察[J].财贸经济,40(12):50-64.Miao X L,Zhao Y X.2019.The effect of local debt on regional TFP growth:Based on inspection of the groups with different financial independence[J].Finance and Trade Economics,40(12):50-64.(in Chinese)
• 彭冲,陆铭.2019.从新城看治理:增长目标短期化下的建城热潮及后果[J].管理世界,35(8):44-57,190-191.Peng C,Lu M.2019.Governance and new towns:The city construction fever pursuing short-term growth and its consequences[J].Management World,35(8):44-57,190-191.(in Chinese)
• 彭山桂,孙昊,王健,等.2021.地方政府土地出让行为中的官员个人效应[J].资源科学,43(1):134-147.Peng S G,Sun H,Wang J,et al.2021.Officials'individual effect on local government land transfer behavior[J].Resources Science,43(1):134-147.(in Chinese)
• 蒲丹琳,王善平.2014.官员晋升激励、经济责任审计与地方政府投融资平台债务[J].会计研究,(5):88-93,95.Pu D L,Wang S P.2014.Official'promotion incentive,economic responsibility auditing and local government liabilities[J].Accounting Research,(5):88-93,95.(in Chinese)
• 沈丽,范文晓.2021.地方政府债务扩张对区域金融风险的溢出效应[J].经济与管理评论,37(2):51-63.Shen L,Fan W X.2021.Spillover effect of local government debt expansion on regional financial risk[J].Review of Economy and Management,37(2):51-63.(in Chinese)
• 宋冉,陈广汉.2016.官员特征、经历与地方政府教育支出偏好---来自中国地级市的经验证据[J].经济管理,38(12):149-169.Song R,Chen G H.2016.Officials'characteristics,experiences and government education expenditure preference:Evidence from Chinese cities[J].Economic Management Journal,38(12):149-169.(in Chinese)
• 王瑞民,陶然,刘明兴.2016.中国地方财政体制演变的逻辑与转型[J].国际经济评论,(2):101-126,6-7.Wang R M,Tao R,Liu M X.2016.The evolutionary logic and reform of China'local fiscal system[J].International Economic Review,(2):101-126,6-7.(in Chinese)
• 王叙果,张广婷,沈红波.2012.财政分权、晋升激励与预算软约束---地方政府过度负债的一个分析框架[J].财政研究,(3):10-15.Wang X G,Zhang G T,Shen H B.2012.Fiscal decentralization,promotion incentives and soft budget constraint[J].Public Finance Research,(3):10-15.(in Chinese)
• 文雁兵,郭瑞,史晋川.2020.用贤则理:治理能力与经济增长---来自中国百强县和贫困县的经验证据[J].经济研究,55(3):18-34.Wen Y B,Guo R,Shi J C.2020.Governance capacity and economic growth:Evidence from China'top 100 counties and national-level poor counties[J].Economic Research Journal,55(3):18-34.(in Chinese)
• 姚洋,席天扬,李力行,等.2020.选拔、培养和激励---来自CCER官员数据库的证据[J].经济学(季刊),19(3):1017-1040.Yao Y,Xi T Y,Li L X,et al.2020.Selection,training and incentivizing:Evidence from the CCER officials dataset[J].China Economic Quarterly,19(3):1017-1040.(in Chinese)
• 徐军伟,毛捷,管星华.2020.地方政府隐性债务再认识---基于融资平台公司的精准界定和金融势能的视角[J].管理世界,36(9):37-59.Xu J W,Mao J,Guan X H.2020.Re-understanding of the hidden debt of local governments:Based on the precise definition of financing platform companies and the perspective of financial potential[J].Management World,36(9):37-59.
• 余靖雯,王敏,郭凯明.2019.土地财政还是土地金融?---地方政府基础设施建设融资模式研究[J].经济科学,(1):69-81.Yu J W,Wang M,Guo K M.2019.Land leasing or land mortgage:A study on financing patterns of the infrastructure construction of local governments in China[J].Economic Science,(1):69-81.(in Chinese)
• 臧传琴,初帅.2016.地方官员特征、官员交流与环境治理---基于2003-2013年中国25个省级单位的经验证据[J].财经论丛,(11):105-112.Zang C Q,Chu S.2016.Local officials'characteristics,exchange and environmental management-Empirical evidence from 25 provincial units of China in 2003-2013[J].Collected Essays on Finance and Economics,(11):105-112.(in Chinese)
• 张豪,戴静,张建华.2017.政策不确定、官员异质性与企业全要素生产率[J].经济学动态,(8):49-61.Zhang H,Dai J,Zhang J H.2017.The uncertainty of policy,the heterogeneity of officials,and the total factor productivity of enterprises[J].Economic Perspectives,(8):49-61.(in Chinese)
• 张积家,陈俊.2002.大学生的成就动机和成功恐惧研究[J].应用心理学,(2):18-22.Zhang J J,Chen J.2002.A Study on the Achievement Motivation and Success Fear of College Students[J].Applied Psychology,(2):18-22.(in Chinese)
• 张军,樊海潮,许志伟,等.2020.GDP增速的结构性下调:官员考核机制的视角[J].经济研究,55(5):31-48.Zhang J,Fan H C,Xu Z W,et al.2020.Structural decline in the GDP growth rate:The impact of the official assessment mechanism[J].Economic Research Journal,55(5):31-48.(in Chinese)
• 张琦,郑瑶,孔东民.2019.地区环境治理压力、高管经历与企业环保投资---一项基于《环境空气质量标准(2012)》的准自然实验[J].经济研究,54(6):183-198.Zhang Q,Zheng Y,Kong D M.2019.Local environmental governance pressure,executive'working experience and enterprise investment in environmental protection:Aquasi-natural experiment based on China'“Ambient Air Quality Standards 2012”[J].Economic Research Journal,54(6):183-198.(in Chinese)
• 张曾莲,江帆.2017.财政分权、晋升激励与预算软约束---基于政府过度负债省级政府数据的实证分析[J].山西财经大学学报,39(6):15-25.Zhang Z L,Jiang F.2017.Fiscal decentralization,promotion incentive and soft budget constraint:An empirical analysis of governmental over-indebted provincial government data[J].Journal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University,39(6):15-25.(in Chinese)
• 赵焱,李开颜.2016.GDP激励、债务审计与地方官员经济行为[J].宏观经济研究,(7):48-59.Zhao Y,Li K Y.2016.GDP incentive,debt auditing and economic behavior of local officials[J].Macroeconomics,(7):48-59.(in Chinese)
• 周广肃,张牧扬,樊纲.2020.地方官员任职经历、公共转移支付与居民消费不平等[J].经济学(季刊),19(1):61-80.Zhou G S,Zhang M Y,Fan G.2020.Career background,public transfer and consumption inequality[J].China Economic Quarterly,19(1):61-80.(in Chinese)
• 周黎安.2007.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,(7):36-50.Zhou L A.2007.Governing China'local officials:An analysis of promotion tournament model[J].Economic Research Journal,(7):36-50.(in Chinese)
• 朱光喜,陈景森.2019.地方官员异地调任何以推动政策创新扩散?---基于议程触发与政策决策的比较案例分析[J].公共行政评论,12(4):124-142,192-193.Zhu G X,Chen J S.2019.Local geographical leadership mobility and policy innovation diffusion[J].Journal of Public Administration,12 (4):124-142,192-193.(in Chinese)
• 踪家峰,岳耀民.2013.官员交流、任期与经济一体化---来自省级经验的证据[J].公共管理学报,10(4):57-67,139-140.Zong J F,Yue Y M.2013.Subnational leader'rotation,tenure and economic integration---Evidence from China[J].Journal of Public Management,10(4):57-67,139-140.(in Chinese)
• Cuestas J C,Regis P J.2018.On the dynamics of sovereign debt in China:Sustainability and structural change[J].Economic Modelling,68:356-359.
• Hambrick D C,Mason P A.1984.Upper Echelons:The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers[J].Academy of Management Review,9(2):193-206.
• He Z P,Jia G L.2020.Rethinking China'local government debts in the frame of modern money theory[J].Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,43(2):210-230.
• Lahoti R,Sahoo S.2020.Are educated leaders good for education?Evidence from India[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,176:42-62.
• Li H B,Zhou L A.2005.Political turnover and economic performance:The incentive role of personnel control in China[J].Journal of Public Economics,89(9/10):1743-1762.
• Li X,Ge X Y,Fan W,et al.2021.Research on spatial correlation characteristics and their spatial spillover effect of local government debt risks in China[J].Sustainability,13(5):2687.
• Lu M,Zhong H Y.2018.Eurozonization of the Chinese economy:How do intergovernmental transfers affect local government debt in China?[J].Asian Economic Papers,17(1):1-18.
• Lu M,Xia L J,Xiao J C.2019.Pro-social leadership under authoritarianism:Provincial leaders'educational backgrounds and fiscal expenditure structure in China[J].Economics of Transition and Institutional Change,27(1):5-30.
• Meng H,Huang X J,Yang H,et al.2019.The influence of local officials'promotion incentives on carbon emission in Yangtze River Delta,China[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,213:1337-1345.
• Pan F H,Zhang F M,Zhu S J,et al.2017.Developing by borrowing?Inter-jurisdictional competition,land finance and local debt accumulation in China[J].Urban Studies,54(4):897-916.
• Que W,Zhang Y B,Schulze G.2019.Is public spending behavior important for Chinese official promotion?Evidence from city-level[J].China Economic Review,54:403-417.
• Takeuchi H,Taki Y,Sekiguchi A,et al.2015.Brain structures in the sciences and humanities[J].Brain Structure&Function,220(6):3295-3305.
• Wu M Q,Chen B.2016.Assignment of provincial officials based on economic performance:Evidence from China[J].China Economic Review,38:60-75.
• Zhao R B,Tian Y X,Lei A,et al.2019.The effect of local government debt on regional economic growth in China:A nonlinear relationship approach[J].Sustainability,11(11):3065.
• (1)《中国社科院|资产负债表地方政府债务风险有多大》,https://ishare.ifeng.com/c/s/7s51hqQwczZ。
• (2)《财政部关于进一步做好地方政府债券发行工作的意见》,http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2021/content_5578544.htm。
• (3)《中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要》(2021年3月13日发布),http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.htm。
• (4)《发挥好纪律建设标本兼治的利器作用---写在新修订〈中国共产党纪律处分条例〉施行一周年之际》,https://jjjcb.ccdi.gov.cn/epaper/index.html?guid=1408330047873351681。
• (1)《中共中央国务院关于新时代推进西部大开发形成新格局的指导意见》,http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-05/17/content_5512456.htm。
• (1)《中共中央国务院关于新时代推进西部大开发形成新格局的指导意见》,http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-05/17/content_5512456.htm。
• (1)研究按照东中西部地区对中国区域进行划分。其中,东部地区包括河北、辽宁、江苏、浙江、福建、山东、广东等省份,中部地区包括山西、内蒙古、吉林、黑龙江、安徽、江西、河南、湖北、湖南等省(自治区),西部地区包括广西、海南、四川、贵州、云南、西藏、陕西、甘肃、青海、宁夏、新疆等省(自治区)。
• (2)设置虚拟变量:无调任经历为1,正科及以下西进为2,副处西进为3,正处西进为4,副厅西进为5,正厅西进为6,副部西进为7。
• (1)初中学历设为9年,高中及中专学历设为12年,大专学历设为15年,本科学历设为16年,硕士研究生学历设为19年,博士研究生学历设为22年。
• (1)具体结果受篇幅限制省略,感兴趣的读者可联系作者获取。
• (2)本研究使用徐军伟等(2020)统计的地方政府隐形债务数据中的有息债务变量,具体有息债务包括地方城投债和银行贷款等。
• (3)若当年市委书记或市长发生更替,研究参考罗党论和佘国满(2015)等已有关于官员更替较为成熟的研究方法:若官员更替发生于当年6月前,则以新上任官员的个人信息数据进行匹配;若官员更替发生于当年6月后,则以原任期官员的个人信息数据进行匹配。
• (1)具体结果受篇幅限制省略,感兴趣的读者可联系作者获取。
• (1)表4及后续回归表所报告的回归结果为以市长样本数据展开的实证检验,以市委书记样本数据展开的实证检验结果与表4基本保持一致,受篇幅限制省略,感兴趣的读者可联系作者获取。
• (1)详见《习近平主持召开中央财经委员会第五次会议》,http://www.cntheory.com/zycjwyhlchy/zycjwyhhy/202110/t20211008_20151.html。