在田野中丰富意义:以府际政策博弈研究为例Enriching Meanings in Fieldwork:Evidence from a Study on Intergovernmental Policy Bargaining
马啸
摘要(Abstract)：
社会科学研究中的理论建构力求发现纷繁复杂现象背后的抽象、简洁的一般性规律。然而构建理论所必需的假设往往基于现实世界的经验。过分依赖已知假设建构理论会使得理论叙事脱离现实并失去生命力。进入田野,接受经验世界的信息冲击,思考现实与理论假设之间的张力,能够为理论建构注入新的洞见和活力。本文以一项关于府际政策博弈的研究为例,展示了田野调查对笔者构建理论解释的影响。经典的府际关系文献关注政府内的不同部门、层级间的行动者的互动。田野调查的经历让笔者注意到了政府外的社会力量与政府内的行动者可能产生的共振,进而为理论建构引入了新的视角。
关键词(KeyWords)： 理论建构;田野;府际政策博弈;社会力量;行动者
基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目“中国地方治理结构与产权保护:理论与实证”(项目批准号:72004004);; 北京市社会科学基金青年学术带头人项目“政府政策过程与区域协同发展”(项目批准号:21DTR018)资助
作者(Author): 马啸
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