吴建祖,王碧莹

• 1:兰州大学管理学院

摘要(Abstract)：

强化环境政绩考核并激励地方政府主政官员提高环境治理效率，是实现生态文明建设的重要制度保障。本文以中共中央组织部颁布《关于改进地方党政领导班子和领导干部政绩考核工作的通知》(简称“政绩考核新规”)为准实验，以2011—2019年中国256个地级市为样本，运用广义双重和三重差分方法检验政绩考核新规对地方政府主政官员环境治理的晋升激励效应，以及财政压力对这一效应的边际影响。研究发现，政绩考核新规能够激励晋升动机较高的地方政府主政官员提高环境治理效率，但这种激励效应不具有长效性。此外，财政压力越大，政绩考核新规的晋升激励效应越弱。本文的实践启示是，中央政府可以通过改变政绩考核制度激励地方政府主政官员达到中央政府的政策目标。同时，为了使政绩考核制度的激励效应发挥作用，中央政府还应充分考虑地方政府以及地方主政官员的异质性，并提供诸如财政支持等配套政策措施。

关键词(KeyWords)： 政绩考核;环境治理效率;官员晋升动机;财政压力;广义双重差分

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金面上项目“基于注意力基础观的企业环境战略研究”(项目批准号:71972094);; 中央高校基本科研业务项目“政绩考核新规的环境治理效应及作用机制研究”(项目批准号:22lzujbkyxs018)资助

作者(Author): 吴建祖,王碧莹

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