包国宪,王智孝

• 1:兰州大学管理学院
• 2:兰州大学中国政府绩效管理研究中心

摘要(Abstract)：

绩效激励对绩效影响的层级外部效应尚待考察。本研究基于压力型体制，聚焦S省税务绩效管理，运用多层线性模型(HLM)与模糊断点回归(FRD),考察上级组织荣登绩效光荣榜对下级组织绩效提升的影响。本研究发现，上级组织榜上有名对下级组织绩效提升有负向影响，而且主要影响外管系统绩效提升。这一研究发现通过了严格的稳健性检验。在压力型体制下，这可以解释为，上级组织受到绩效激励，会对下级组织施加绩效压力，且对外管系统施加的绩效压力更大，对内设系统施加的绩效压力有限，而绩效压力对绩效提升有限制作用。辅以“三权”框架，通过对S省税务局内设系统绩效评价的案例考察，研究还发现，用自上而下的评价代替自评，可以更好地对内设系统施加绩效压力。本研究有助于丰富绩效激励跨层级影响方面的理论体系，对层级制组织中的绩效激励机制设计具有启示意义。

关键词(KeyWords)： 绩效激励;“三权”框架;绩效评价;压力型体制

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 研究阐释党的十九届四中全会精神国家社会科学基金重点项目“国家治理效能目标导向下的政府职责体系优化研究”(项目批准号:20AZD032)的资助

作者(Author): 包国宪,王智孝

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