华若筠,邓国胜

• 1:清华大学公共管理学院

摘要(Abstract)：

慈善组织的透明度问题是学术界长期关注的重点。基于文献研究,本文提出治理结构是影响慈善组织透明度的重要因素等理论假设,并运用中国公募基金会的数据,对此进行了实证研究,结果表明:首先,慈善组织理事会的权力配置对于透明度确实存在影响;其次,监事和外部理事对透明度的作用并不显著;最后,执行层的薪资与透明度呈负相关关系。

关键词(KeyWords)： 治理结构;慈善组织;透明度

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author): 华若筠,邓国胜

参考文献(References)：

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• ④事实上,我们应当对理事会中各利益相关方的构成对透明度的影响进行实证检验,但是由于数据获得的困难,我们在本研究中并没有对此假设进行检验,是一个缺憾。我们在这里只能用理事会规模代替,因此中国公募基金会理事会的成员的产生方式便极为重要。通过案例研究我们发现,小规模的理事会往往更多地包括与基金会自身相关的理事,而较少包括利益相关方代表,只有在理事会规模足够大的情况下,才更多地容纳利益相关方代表。
• ①需要指出的是,在实际中,由于理事会开会数量有限,以及利益相关方参与组织的运作和决策的程度有限,因此产权所有者对于执行层的外部监督作用显然没有“剩余索取权”产生的执行层自我规制和监督的内部监督作用大。
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• ⑥《基金会管理条例》第三章第二十二条规定:基金会设监事。监事任期与理事任期相同。理事、理事的近亲属和基金会财会人员不得兼任监事。
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• ①中国基金会中心网:http://www.foundationcenter.org.cn/.
• ②用G*Power软件计算得到在第一类错误和第二类错误小于0.05的水平,最小样本量为107,有效的卡方为3.086。本研究所选取的样本量为200.大于要求的最小样本量。
• ③中国社会组织网基金会子站:http://jjh.chinanpo.gov.cn/index.html.
• ④具体指标详情请参见G.Deng等.对基金会透明度测量体系的研究.Deng G,Hua,R.Indicators for transparency of foundations:A case of China.Working Paper:Tsinghua University,2014.
• ①《基金会管理条例》第三章组织机构第二十条:“基金会设理事会,理事为5人至25人,理事任期由章程规定,但每届任期不得超过5年。理事任期届满,连选可以连任。”