杨芸榕,李洪涛

• 1:桂林电子科技大学马克思主义学院
• 2:大连理工大学人文与社会科学学部

摘要(Abstract)：

我国发展进入新时代，经济社会发展日益复杂，这对党和政府的治理能力、治理模式、治理效率都提出了更高的要求，也对各级政府官员执政能力形成巨大考验。改革开放后一系列中央文件、会议精神提出领导干部要不断强化学习，要提升干部的领导能力专业化水平。目前研究多聚焦于官员学历对晋升选拔的作用，本文则从官员再教育学习的内生机制入手，对官员再教育经历获取的驱动因素及作用逻辑展开系统分析。本研究基于政治精英选拔理论与官员晋升锦标赛理论，由理论分析和实证分析两个层面对官员特征、更替压力与再教育经历之间的关系展开研究。本研究通过对我国281个地级及以上城市的市长信息数据的手工收集整理构建面板数据模型，并进一步通过空间计量模型对官员特征、更替压力对再教育经历获取的空间关联效应展开分析。研究发现：第一，官员的年龄与其再教育经历之间呈现负向关系，年轻官员更倾向于再教育经历的获取；第二，官员在外部更替压力较弱时会倾向于通过再教育获取的方式提升自身竞争力；第三，地区更替压力趋同、其他城市市长具备再教育经历优势时，官员也会倾向于在任期内积极获取再教育经历。

关键词(KeyWords)： 官员特征;更替压力;官员教育经历;政治精英选拔;官员晋升锦标赛

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“构建高质量社会领域公共服务体系研究”(项目批准号:21JZD034)资助

作者(Author): 杨芸榕,李洪涛

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• (2)本研究对官员再教育经历次数的定义为其结束第一学历、开始第一份工作后所获取的全部教育经历,包括本科及研究生教育、党校培训、中青班与干部培训、函授学习等。
• (3)具体结果受篇幅限制在此省略,感兴趣的读者可联系作者获取。