董志霖,闫泽华

• 1:北京大学经济学院
• 2:北京工业大学文法学部

摘要(Abstract)：

官员任期对地方政府行为以及地方治理水平的"倒U形"效应似乎已成为主流理论分析框架,但以往的实证文献未能对这类关系提供强而有力的实证依据。为了检验当前官员任期效应的主要实证观点是否受到具体研究特征的影响,本文选取了现有关于官员任期与辖区经济增长关系的实证文献进行荟萃回归分析。结果发现:官员任期与辖区经济增长关系的显著性受到不同研究特征的影响,尤其是"倒U形"效应的实证结果显著受到样本量、样本行政级别、官员类型、因变量指标选取、固定资产投资率变量选取等研究特征的影响。并且,体现官员任期与辖区经济增长之间呈"倒U形"关系的实证文献存在较为明显的发表偏倚问题。据此,本文认为该方向当前的研究结果在后续使用时须谨慎。后续研究应进一步从技术和理论两个层面提高研究的稳健性。

关键词(KeyWords)： 官员任期;经济增长;荟萃回归分析

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author): 董志霖,闫泽华

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• (1)文献检索时间截至2020年3月14日。此外，经济增长也是政府绩效的重要指标，也能反映官员任期与政治激励水平之间的关系。并且，目标经济增长与实际经济增长高度相关，因此，本文将因变量为经济增长目标的研究也纳入样本文献。具体参见：马亮，2013。
• (2)代表文献有：徐现祥和王贤彬，2010；顾海兵和雷英迪，2013。
• (3)1988年6月，中央组织部颁布《关于试行地方党政领导干部年度工作考核制度的通知》。
• (1)由于8个结果显著为正的线性关系模型均使用了增长率作为因变量，且只有一个模型使用省级数据，无法对因变量是否使用增长率、省级行政级别的影响进行拟合，因此剔除“省级行政级别”和“经济增长”变量。
• (1)由于14个结果显著为负的线性关系模型均使用了增长率作为因变量，无法对因变量是否使用增长率的影响进行拟合，因此在模型中剔除“经济增长”变量。
• (1)由于17个结果显著为“倒U形”关系的模型均使用了固定效应估计方法，无法对方法是否为固定效应的影响进行拟合，因此在模型中剔除“控制方法”变量。