杨开峰,刘杨,文伟铭

• 1:中国人民大学公共管理学院
• 2:中国人民大学循证治理与公共绩效研究中心
• 3:湖南省溆浦县祖师殿镇人民政府

摘要(Abstract)：

作为非经济领域激励地方政府实现职能高效配置的重要举措和“锦标赛”,“评比表彰”能否提升公众的政府绩效感知?将2011至2015年主要环境评比表彰结果与中国社会状况综合调查进行匹配，本研究发现：城市在环境评比中获奖有助于提升公众对客观环境质量和政府总体治理绩效的感知，但与公众的政府环境治理绩效感知没有显著关系。此外，获奖数量与公众对环境质量和政府总体绩效的感知呈“倒U形”关系，达到临界点前，获奖越多，公众绩效感知越积极；而超出临界点后获得更多奖项反而会使公众的绩效感知更消极。本研究拓展了“客观绩效—主观绩效”的理论联系，也具有现实启示，适度的评比表彰既有“自上而下”引导指挥的工具属性，又有“自下而上”提升公众满意的价值属性。

关键词(KeyWords)： 评比表彰模式;主观绩效;政府绩效感知;环境治理;环境锦标赛

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金管理科学部专项项目“公共数据开放利用与授权运营理论与制度设计”(项目批准号:72342010);; 国家社会科学基金重大专项项目“国家治理体系和治理能力现代化指标体系研究”(项目批准号:17VZL003)的资助

作者(Author): 杨开峰,刘杨,文伟铭

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• ① 限于篇幅，本文在报告后续实证表格时均略去控制变量具体结果，可联系作者获取。
• ① 需要说明的是，所有进入第一阶段回归的控制变量均被纳入第二阶段回归模型中，但限于篇幅，本文在报告两阶段回归表格时均略去控制变量的具体结果。
• ① 限于篇幅，本文只报告了多层线性模型的回归结果，略去结论一致的广义多层模型，可联系作者获取。
• (1)限于篇幅,附表报告了环境评奖项目的基本情况及评选标准。
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• (3)环境评比表彰是锦标赛的五个前提:(1)锦标赛的主持者和裁判能决定奖品分配:晋升竞争、职位生存、财政激励、声誉激励;(2)存在一种从委托人和代理人角度看都可以衡量的客观竞赛指标:环境指标、评比表彰本身;(3)各参赛主体的竞争成绩是相对可分离和可比较的:城市参评、择优获奖;(4)参赛主体能够在很大程度上控制和影响最终考核绩效;(5)参赛主体之间不容易合谋:朋辈竞争、中央设奖、多次评比。限于篇幅本文不再报告城市获奖数量的地区分布地图,有需要者可联系作者获取。该图佐证了评比表彰仍是“锦标赛”。获奖城市集中在东部和南部,这种跨越五年和七类环境奖项分布的区分度表明,至少到目前为止,评比表彰并不是最终将以多轮次覆盖全部城市的“达标赛”,也没有表现出后续评比以隐性方式降低标准和向未获奖地区倾斜的趋势。
• (4)晕轮效应(Halo effect):又称光环效应,是一种社会认知偏差。原指对某个人某方面特征的认知和评价影响到对此人整体印象的一种心理现象。这里指对城市环境领域治理的评价影响对城市整体治理绩效的评价和感知。这是一种根据某种局部特征推论和扩散到整体特征的“以偏概全”认知方式。
• (5)启发式:指人们在复杂的决策或判断中倾向于使用启发式推断或相关替换(经验法则),大脑在处理信息时不习惯于费力思考,而是满足于相信出现在脑海中的看似合理的判断,使用相关但更容易的问题来替换信息不完全的复杂问题,这也是认知偏差的原因之一。主要有代表性启发式、可得性启发式、锚定与调整性启发式和情感性启发式。
• (6)国务院办公厅.(2006-12-24)[2023-10-01].国务院办公厅转发监察部等部门的关于清理评比达标表彰活动意见的通知(国办发[2006]102号)[EB/OL].https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2007/content_512702.htm.
• (7)新华社.(2009-12-30)[2023-10-01].行政系统中央单位评比达标表彰活动保留项目公示[EB/OL].https://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-12/30/content_1500155.htm.
• (8)本文选择2011年至2015年这五年间的获奖情况,这是因为2010年之后评比表彰活动才逐渐规范化和制度化,2006年至2009年全国清查和取消了很多评比项目,国务院也取消了很多中央层级的评比表彰项目。2010年国务院联合中共中央办公厅印发了《评比达标表彰活动管理办法(试行)》(中办发[2010]33号),真正建立起中央和省两级评比达标活动的审批制度。
• (9)数据来源于中国空气质量在线监测分析平台:https://www.aqistudy.cn/historydata/about.php,查于2022年3月12日。
• (10)在Liu et al.(2018)的基础上,本文选择国家节水型城市、低碳试点城市、中国人居环境奖、国家环境保护模范城市、国家森林城市、国家园林城市和全国绿化模范城市七类评比表彰项目;选择依据是:(1)环境领域国家级重大影响力和代表性的奖项、称号和表彰,体现为政府的大力宣传和重视,能被政府官网和人民日报等广泛报道;(2)评选主体主要是城市,而不是区县、项目、流域或园区;(3)首次评比开始的时间早于2011年,且至少持续至2015年。
• (11)采用空气质量指数(Air Quality Index,AQI)描述空气清洁或污染程度以及对健康的影响,主要通过五个主要污染物标准进行测算:地面臭氧、颗粒物污染(包括PM2.5和PM10)、一氧化碳、二氧化硫和二氧化氮。AQI为连续型变量,数值越大表示污染程度越高,通常0～50为一级,空气质量报告为优;51～100为二级,空气质量报告为良;101～150为三级,空气质量报告为轻度污染;161～200为四级,空气质量报告为中度污染;201～300为五级,空气质量报告为重度污染;300以上为六级,空气质量报告为严重污染。
• (12)需要说明的是,城市获奖情况的观测数据为111个,本文在描述部分针对这111个获奖城市情况进行了统计分析。但由于人口规模、财政自主度、空气质量指数、公园绿地面积、工业废水排放、生活垃圾处理和工业固体废物综合利用等城市层面控制变量的部分缺失,最终进入回归模型中的城市样本为100个。
• (13)控制变量的显著性如下。(1)个体层面:男性和在农村居住的人有更积极的绩效感知;主观经济水平更高、对社会总体评价更好、社会公平感和生活满意度更高的人对环境绩效更满意;对公共事务越关切,越积极参与环境等治理过程,对环境和政府工作现状可能越不满意。(2)城市层面:经济水平、经济增长率和行政级别更高城市的公众绩效感知更积极;更大的人均公园绿地面积反而导致公众对环境的满意度降低,这可能是由于城市绿地面积达到一定阈值后,植物的挥发性有机物加剧臭氧污染,降低蒸腾降温等生态功效,从环境健康科学的视角看,过度的“绿地暴露”和绿地可得性也可能提升公众的环境污染暴露风险,从而影响他们对日常空间环境质量的感知。
• (14)模型4-1和模型4-2的二次项虽然在至少为10%的显著度水平上并不显著,但是也保持了符号的一致性。二者的p值虽然不小于0.1,但也较小,分别为0.157和0.175。根据对“唯P值论”的批判,因此本文根据统计结果进行科学推论时,应该采用估量思考(Estimation thinking)而不是非黑即白的二元思考(Dichotomous thinking),因此本文并没有放弃这个不显著的结果,而是汇报其对应的较小p值。
• (15)国家发展改革委.(2017-01-07)[2022-02-03].国家发展改革委关于开展第三批国家低碳试点城市工作的通知(发改气候[2017]66号)[EB/OL].https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/tz/201701/t20170124_962888.html.
• (16)住房和城乡建设部.(2022-01-06)[2022-02-03].住房和城乡建设部关于印发国家园林城市申报与评选管理办法的通知(建城[2022]2号)[EB/OL].https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-01/14/content_5668177.htm.
• (17)山西省林业和草原局.(2021-12-27)[2022-02-03].全国绿化评比表彰实施办法[EB/OL].http://lcj.shanxi.gov.cn/lczl/zthc/zllh/zhxx/202112/t20211227_4259672.html.
• (18)Chen et al.(2018)采用环境、能耗、污染、减排和环保五个词语总字数占全文总字数的比例作为政府环境治理的代理变量。陈诗一和陈登科(2018)采用环境保护、环保、污染、能耗、减排、排污、生态、绿色、低碳、空气、化学需氧量、二氧化硫、二氧化碳、PM10、PM2.5等词语。本文在此基础上选取的词语包括:环境保护、环保、污染、能耗、减排、排污、节能、节水、生态、绿色、低碳、空气、化学需氧量、二氧化硫、二氧化碳、PM10和PM2.5。
• (19)新华社.(2015-01-30)[2023-09-01].中央文明委公示第四届全国文明城市(区)、文明村镇、文明单位候选名单[EB/OL].https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-01/30/content_2812168.htm.
• (20)卫计生委网站,中央政府门户网站.(2015-12-08)[2023-09-01].全国爱卫办公布2015年拟命名国家卫生城市(区)名单[EB/OL].https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-12/08/content_5021061.htm.
• (21)限于篇幅,在此不再报告稳健性检验的各项具体结果,可联系作者获取。
• (22)重新编码以“是否满意”为标准对定序变量降维,将“不太好”“很不好”和6分以下的绩效感知界定为“不满意”,赋值为0,其余正面评价为“满意”,赋值为1。除此之外,文献中对定序变量做因变量的处理方式还有两种:(1)近似地视为连续变量采用线性模型,尤其是1～10分量表时;(2)选取更适合定序变量的有序逻辑回归。这是本文主体研究中所采用的方法。
• (23)习近平.2013-12-27(02).在纪念毛泽东同志诞辰120周年座谈会上的讲话[N].人民日报.
• (24)负性偏见(negative bias):人们对信息的处理具有“不对称性”,对所接收信息中的负面因素更为敏感,对负面信息的关注、学习和使用远远多于正面信息。负面信息更容易被感知,消极事件比非消极事件引发的反应更快更显著。
• (25)代理受害 (vicarious victimization):指自身没有受害的公民仍然可能通过从朋友、邻居或媒体那里听到他们附近的犯罪活动而意识到他们周围的犯罪活动。本文指自身的生活没有因为城市参与环境评比表彰而受到影响的公民可能因为媒体报道和亲朋好友的经验获得关于政府环境治理的替代信息,形成负面认知。