何以“加码”与如何“接码”:科层组织层层加码的行为逻辑“Hierarchical Escalation” and Opportunistic Behavior:The Behavioral Logic of Hierarchical Organizations in Escalating Demands at Each Level
李智超,于翔
摘要(Abstract):
层层加码是中国科层组织在政策执行中重复出现的组织现象。“层层加码”概念涵盖着差异化的组织行为及其后果。层层加码在何种情况下出现?上级不同的“加码”方式与下级各类“接码”行为之间如何关联?本文从整合性的视角出发,提出一组“加码”与“接码”的类型学解释。分析认为在“委托方—管理方—代理方”结构中,强组织激励与高任务风险是触发层层加码的必要条件,高风险强激励对管理方的“加码”方式具有形塑效应,对代理方的“接码”行为具有调节效应。差异化的激励结构与任务风险,形塑了管理方政府“目标加码”“工具加码”两种类型的加码方式。激励扭曲与风险放大调节强化了代理方机会主义倾向,诱发了政绩注水、信息隐匿、过度执行与形式主义等多重策略行为。
关键词(KeyWords): 层层加码;激励结构;任务风险;科层组织;政策执行
基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金面上项目“级联灾害的城市应急合作治理网络研究:结构、绩效与优化”(项目批准号:72374132);; 上海市软科学研究项目“面向韧性安全城市建设的技术预见与重大风险源识别研究”(项目批准号:24692113900)的资助
作者(Author): 李智超,于翔
参考文献(References):
- 陈家建,赵阳.2020.“科级天花板”:县域治理视角下的基层官员晋升问题[J].开放时代,(5):186-199.Chen J J,Zhao Y.2020.“Section-level Ceiling”:The problem of official promotion in county governance[J].Open Times,(5):186-199.(in Chinese) 陈家建,张洋洋.2021.“非对称权责”结构与社区属地化管理[J].社会学评论,9(3):143-163.Chen J J,Zhang Y Y.2021.Asymmetric power and responsibility structure and localized management in community[J].Sociological Review of China,9(3):143-163.(in Chinese) 陈科霖,谷志军.2022.多元政绩竞赛:中国地方官员晋升的新解释[J].政治学研究,(1):117-128.Chen K L,Gu Z J.2022.Pluralistic political achievements competition:A new explanation for promotion of Chinese local cadres[J].CASS Journal of Political Science,(1):117-128.(in Chinese) 陈新.2021.注意力竞争与技术执行:数字化形式主义的反思及其超越[J].社会科学战线,(8):229-234.Chen X.2021.Attention competition and technological execution:Rethinking digital formalism and its transcendence[J].Social Science Front,(8):229-234.(in Chinese) 何艳玲,汪广龙.2012.不可退出的谈判:对中国科层组织“有效治理”现象的一种解释[J].管理世界,(12):61-72.He Y L,Wang G L.2012.Unwithdrawable negotiations:An explanation for the phenomenon of “Effective Governance” in China's hierarchical organizations[J].Management World,(12):61-72.(in Chinese) 侯祥鹏.2018.地方政府“层层加码”与人口城镇化推进——基于“十三五”规划文本的实证分析[J].现代经济探讨,(2):116-126.Hou X P.2018.Local government's layers of escalating and the advancement of urbanization of population:An empirical analysis based on the text of the 13th Five-Year Plan[J].Modern Economic Research,(2):116-126.(in Chinese) 黄扬.2023.“试探性违规-选择性容忍”:对运动式监管失灵的组织学解释[J].公共管理评论,5(2):25-48.Huang Y.2023.“Tentative Violations” and “Selective Tolerance”:An organizational interpretation of the failure of campaign-styles regulations[J].China Public Administration Review,5(2):25-48.(in Chinese) 李辉.2022a.层层加码:反制科层组织执行衰减的一种策略[J].中国行政管理,(4):89-94.Li H.2022a.Add code layer by layer:A strategy to counter the implement decay of bureaucratic execution[J].Chinese Public Administration,(4):89-94.(in Chinese) 李辉.2022b.科层焦虑的生成、释放与再生产:对“层层加码”现象的一种解释[J].行政论坛,29(6):44-49.Li H.2022b.The generation,release and reproduction of bureaucratic organization anxiety:An explanation of the phenomenon of “Add Code Layer by Layer”[J].Administrative Tribune,29(6):44-49.(in Chinese) 李智超,于翔,胡志平.2023.从“亡羊补牢”到“未雨绸缪”:绩效挤出、全过程安全规制与安全生产治理[J].中国行政管理,39(4):146-154.Li Z C,Yu X,Hu Z P.2023.Whole process of safety regulation,performance crowding-out effect and safety governance[J].Chinese Public Administration,39(4):146-154.(in Chinese) 梁玉柱.2021.可接受的问责:地方官员为何“铤而走险”?——基于棚户区改造中政府强拆案例分析[J].公共管理学报,18(2):34-44,166.Liang Y Z.2021.Acceptable accountability:Why do local officials take risks?—Case study on forced demolition in slum reconstruction in China[J].Journal of Public Management,18(2):34-44,166.(in Chinese) 凌争.2020.主动“加码”:基层政策执行新视角——基于H省J县的村干部选举案例研究[J].中国行政管理,(2):87-93.Ling Z.2020.Intentionally Added Workload (jia ma):A new dimension of policy implementation of local government—A case study of village cadres election in J County of H Province[J].Chinese Public Administration,(2):87-93.(in Chinese) 马啸,马佳磊.2021.科层激励结构的魅影:基层治理中政策执行变形的类型与成因[J].北大政治学评论,(3):146-164.Ma X,Ma J L.2021.Phantom of bureaucratic incentive structure:Types and causes of policy implementation distortion in grassroots governance[J].PKU Political Science Review,(3):146-164.(in Chinese) 梅赐琪,翟晓祯.2018.“政绩出官”可持续吗?——挑战晋升锦标赛理论的一个新视角[J].公共行政评论,11(3):7-27,209.Mei C Q,Di X Z.2018.Is performance-based promotion sustainable?A new perspective on political tournament model[J].Journal of Public Administration,11(3):7-27,209.(in Chinese) 倪星,王锐.2017.从邀功到避责:基层政府官员行为变化研究[J].政治学研究,(2):42-51.Ni X,Wang R.2017.From credit claiming to blame avoidance:The change of government officials' behavior[J].CASS Journal of Political Science,(2):42-51.(in Chinese) 聂辉华,李金波.2007.政企合谋与经济发展[J].经济学(季刊),6(1):75-90.Nie H H,Li J B.2007.Collusions between governments and firms and economic development[J].China Economic Quarterly,6(1):75-90.(in Chinese) 彭德怀.1981.彭德怀自述[M].第1版.北京:人民出版社,281-287.Peng D H..1981.Peng Dehuai's Autobiography[M].1st ed.Beijing:People's Press. 王汉生,王一鸽.2009.目标管理责任制:农村基层政权的实践逻辑[J].社会学研究,24(2):61-92,244.Wang H S,Wang Y G.2009.Target management responsibility system:The practical logic of local party-state in rural China[J].Sociological Studies,24(2):61-92,244.(in Chinese) 温晓年.2021.负向强激励背景下基层政府“层层加码”行为的逻辑阐释——以H省部分基层政府返乡防疫政策实施为例[J].领导科学,(18):93-96.Wen X N.2021.Logical elaboration of grassroots government's incremental layering behavior under the context of negative strong incentives:A case study of the implementation of returnee epidemic prevention policies by some grassroots governments in H Province[J].Leadership Science,(18):93-96.(in Chinese) 颜昌武,杨郑媛.2022.加压式减负:基层减负难的一个解释性框架[J].理论与改革,(1):76-86.Yan C W,Yang Z Y.2022.Pressured relief:An explanatory framework for the difficulty of reducing the burden on the primary level government[J].Theory and Reform,(1):76-86.(in Chinese) 杨帆,章志涵.2020.“繁文缛节”如何影响专项治理绩效?——基于基层政府数据的混合研究[J].公共管理评论,2(4):110-132.Yang F,Zhang Z H.2020.How does red tape affect the performance of campaign-style governance?—Evidence from Chinese grassroots governments[J].China Public Administration Review,2(4):110-132.(in Chinese) 杨华.2022.县乡中国:县域治理现代化[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.Yang H.2022.County-Rural China:The modernization of county governance[M].Beijing:China Renmin University Press.(in Chinese) 杨华,张丹丹.2022.沟通式动员:县域上下级政府间政策协商机制及其功能[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),(5):59-67.Yang H,Zhang D D.2022.Communicative mobilization:The negotiation between higher and lower levels of grass-roots governments[J].Journal of Huazhong Agricultural University (Social Sciences Edition),(5):59-67.(in Chinese) 杨雪冬.2012.压力型体制:一个概念的简明史[J].社会科学,(11):4-12.Yang X D.2012.A pressure system:A brief history of a concept[J].Journal of Social Sciences,(11):4-12.(in Chinese) 姚东旻,崔琳,张鹏远,等.2021.中国政府治理模式的选择与转换:一个正式模型[J].社会,41(6):41-74.Yao D M,Cui L,Zhang P Y,et al.2021.Choice and transformation of China's governance modes:A formal model[J].Chinese Journal of Sociology,41(6):41-74.(in Chinese) 殷华方,潘镇,鲁明泓.2007.中央-地方政府关系和政策执行力:以外资产业政策为例[J].管理世界,(7):22-36.Yin H F,Pan Z,Lu M H.2007.Central-local government relationship and the policy excutive force:Taking the policies for foreign-funded industries as an example[J].Management World,(7):22-36.(in Chinese) 张翔.2019.基层政策执行的“共识式变通”:一个组织学解释——基于市场监管系统上下级互动过程的观察[J].公共管理学报,16(4):1-11,168.Zhang X.2019.“Consensus-based Flexibility” in the implementation of grassroots policies:An organizational approach—Based on the observation of the interaction of the market supervision system[J].Journal of Public Management,16(4):1-11,168.(in Chinese) 周黎安.2014.行政发包制[J].社会,34(6):1-38.Zhou L A.2014.Administrative subcontract[J].Chinese Journal of Sociology,34(6):1-38.(in Chinese) 周黎安,刘冲,厉行,等.2015.“层层加码”与官员激励[J].世界经济文汇,(1):1-15.Zhou L A,Liu C,Li X,et al.2015.Layers of escalating and official incentives[J].World Economic Papers,(1):1-15.(in Chinese) 周黎安.2017.转型中的地方政府:官员激励与治理[M].2版.上海:格致出版社.Zhou L A.2017.Local governments in transition:official incentives and governance[M].2nd ed.Shanghai:Truth & Wisdom Press.(in Chinese) 周雪光.2003.组织社会学十讲[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社.Zhou X G.2003.Ten lectures on the sociology of organizations[M].Beijing:Social Science Academic Press (China).(in Chinese) 周雪光,练宏.2012.中国政府的治理模式:一个“控制权”理论[J].社会学研究,27(5):69-93,243.Zhou X G,Lian H.2012 Modes of governance in the Chinese bureaucracy:A “Control Rights” theory[J].Sociological Studies,27(5):69-93,243.(in Chinese) 周雪光.2017.中国国家治理的制度逻辑——一个组织学研究[M].北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店.Zhou X G.2017.The institutional logic of governance in China:An organizational approach[M].Beijing:SDX Joint Publishing Company.(in Chinese) 周振超,张金城.2018.职责同构下的层层加码——形式主义长期存在的一个解释框架[J].理论探讨,(4):28-33.Zhou Z C,Zhang J C.2018 Incremental layering under the isomorphic of responsibilities—An explanatory framework for the persistent existence of formalism[J].Theoretical Investigation,(4):28-33.(in Chinese) Baker G,Gibbons R,Murphy K J.2001.Bringing the market inside the firm[J].The American Economic Review,91(2):212-218. Bendor J,Glazer A,Hammond T.2001.Theories of delegation[J].Annual Review of Political Science,4:235-269. Bohte J,Meier K J.2000.Goal displacement:Assessing the motivation for organizational cheating[J].Public Administration Review,60(2):173-182. Coviello D,Ichino A,Persico N.2014.Time allocation and task juggling[J].The American Economic Review,104(2):609-623. Holmstrom B,Milgrom P.1991.Multitask principal-agent analyses:Incentive contracts,asset ownership,and job design[J].Journal of Law,Economics,& Organization,7:24-52. Leonid H.1973.The design of mechanisms for resource allocation[J].The American Economic Review,63(2):1-30. Matland R E.1995.Synthesizing the implementation literature:The Ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation[J].Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,5(2):145-174. O'Brien K J,Li L J.1999.Selective policy implementation in rural China[J].Comparative Politics,31(2):167-186. Zhu X F,Zhao H.2021.Experimentalist governance with interactive central-local relations:Making new pension policies in China[J].Policy Studies Journal,49(1):13-36.
- (1)引自《 人民日报》文章《亿万人民革命干劲激动人心》(1958-02-01)。 (2)引自《光明日报》文章《对“层层加码”的懒政行为进行整改》(2021-02-05)。 (3)作者基于知网对以“层层加码”为主题的中文期刊文献进行检索和筛选,对选出的34篇文献进行系统性文献综述,将其结构化拆解为经验指涉、解释机制、解释逻辑与解释变量,最后概括归纳得出本文使用的激励结构与任务风险两类解释要素。相关内容限于篇幅未能呈现,如有需要可与作者联系获取。 (4)治理实践中,目标与工具存在紧密关联,放大的任务目标往往意味着使用更多和力度更强的工具,寻求强力工具也往往表征着追求更高的目标。文中的这种分类方式并非意味着要切断二者之间的联系,而是对两种官员目标、激励、约束都存在结构性差异的情境下,在组织行为的概率层面会引发的“高标准”倾向与“严要求”倾向等不同的决策模式以及应对方式进行分类讨论。 (5)新华网.东北多地GDP造假县域经济规模超香港.详见http://www.xinhuanet.com /politics/2015-12/11/c_128519190.htm. (6)澎湃新闻.2020年GDP修订:沪蓉莞调增百亿,82城“挤水分”.详见https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_18966766. (7)山东省应急管理厅官网.山东五彩龙投资有限公司栖霞市笏山金矿“1·10”重大爆炸事故调查报告.详见http://yjt.shandong.gov.cn/zwgk/zdly/aqsc/sgxx/202102/t20210223_3536726.html. (8)中共江苏省委新闻网.江苏多地专项整治“指尖上的形式主义”.详见https://www.zgjssw.gov.cn/yaowen/202203/t20220317_7466770.shtml,