李智超,刘少丹,杨帆

• 1:华东政法大学政治学与公共管理学院

摘要(Abstract)：

中央环保督察已成为环境治理的重要手段与制度安排。地方环境治理呈现明显的地方差异性,环保督察的效果也绝非众城一面。本文使用精确断点回归方法评估中央环保督察对空气污染的治理效果。基于政企合谋视角,分析政商关系对中央环保督察的调节作用,以及城市工业化进程、经济水平、产业结构、官员任期等因素呈现的中央环保督察效果异质性。研究发现:中央环保督察可短期改善被督察地的空气质量,但长期政策效果趋于减弱,甚至会出现污染反弹;在政商关系亲近的城市,中央环保督察对空气质量的改善程度较弱,而在政商关系相对不亲近的城市则效果更强;中央环保督察对空气污染的治理效果还存在着明显的城市异质性。

关键词(KeyWords)： 环保督察;政商关系;运动式治理;断点回归;空气污染治理

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金面上项目“智慧城市建设中的多元主体协同、治理网络与演化机理研究”(项目批准号:71974057);; 上海哲学社会科学规划项目“大数据驱动的大气污染跨区域协同治理机制研究”(项目批准号:2018BGL008)资助

作者(Author): 李智超,刘少丹,杨帆

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• (1)https://epi. envirocenter. yale. edu/2020-epi-report/air-quality,访问时间2021年5月12日。 (2)中央环保督察的内容主要涉及“四个重点”:重点盯住中央高度关注、群众反映强烈、社会影响恶劣的突出环境问题及其处理情况;重点检查环境质量呈现恶化趋势的区域流域及整治情况;重点督察地方党委和政府及其有关部门环保不作为、乱作为的情况;重点了解地方落实环境保护党政同责和一岗双责、严格责任追究等情况。 (1)资料来源于中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅印发的《中央生态环境保护督察工作规定》。 (1)中华人民共和国生态环境部:http://www. mee. gov. cn/ywgz/zysthjbhdc/,由于中央环保督察组进驻各个城市的具体时间难以获取,本文借鉴相关研究一般性做法,将督察组进驻省份的日期与进驻该省地级市日期视为一致。 (1)根据现有研究一般性做法,本文做的是四次多项式与AQI的拟合曲线,并把多项式范围聚焦于断点左右200的范围内,这样可以更加清楚观测断点两侧数值的变化。 (1)感谢匿名评审人关于中央环保督察长期效果稳健性的意见与建议。 (1)SO_2来源于燃煤发电厂、工厂燃煤锅炉等;CO除了来自汽车尾气外,大部分还来源于工业炉窑、内燃机、家庭炉具等产生的不完全燃烧;NO_2主要源于机动车尾气排放和炉窑高温燃烧排放等。 (1)CEADs团队由来自中英欧美等多国研究机构的学者组成,在中国国家自然基金委员会、科技部重点研发计划、中国科学院、英国研究理事会牛顿基金会等多家研究机构的共同支持下,共同编纂中国及发展中国家、地区的多尺度碳核算清单及社会经济与贸易数据库,供学术研究使用。