市场竞争、履约监管与公共服务外包绩效——基于深圳市环卫服务外包的实证分析Market Competition, Compliance Supervision, and Performance of Public Service Outsourcing: An Empirical Analysis Based on the Outsourcing of Sanitation Services in Shenzhen City
叶托,曾言
摘要(Abstract):
公共服务外包既是引导公共管理改革的重要潮流,也是推动公共服务创新的重要工具,其绩效目标的实现离不开充分的市场竞争和精明的政府监管。本文采用2018—2022年深圳市环卫服务外包的数据,实证检验了市场竞争、履约监管以及两者的交互效应对公共服务外包绩效的影响。研究发现,市场竞争维度中的投标供应商数量与公共服务外包绩效显著正相关,而组合外包则会对公共服务外包绩效产生负面作用;履约监管维度中正向的历史绩效差距与同侪绩效差距均会显著提高公共服务外包绩效,而负向的历史绩效差距与同侪绩效差距则会显著降低公共服务外包绩效;市场竞争与履约监管在影响公共服务外包绩效方面存在微弱的互补关系而非替代关系。本研究揭示了市场竞争和履约监管对公共服务外包绩效的影响机制,为优化公共服务外包治理策略提供了有益启示。
关键词(KeyWords): 市场竞争;履约监管;公共服务外包;绩效;环卫服务
基金项目(Foundation): 国家社会科学基金青年项目“政府购买城市社区公共服务的关系合同治理研究”(项目批准号:20CZZ028)的资助
作者(Author): 叶托,曾言
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- (1)二次匹配平均法是一种常用的数据频率转换方法,可以通过二次方程模型将低频数据转换为高频数据。该方法在数据频率转换过程中尽可能保持数据的平滑性和连续性,因此被估算出来的高频数据虽然不是实际观测值,但具有统计学意义。 (2)经济特区设立之初,深圳被经济特区管理线分为“关内”和“关外”地区,前者包括罗湖、福田、南山与盐田区,后者包括宝安、龙岗、光明、龙华、坪山和大鹏新区。