周碧华,刘涛雄

• 1:华侨大学公共管理学院
• 2:清华大学社会科学学院

摘要(Abstract)：

具有组织承诺偏好的代理人不仅关心自身收入而且也关心组织利益,本文考虑组织承诺对参与人效用函数的影响,在此基础上拓展基本的委托—代理模型并归纳最优契约特征。研究表明,组织承诺本身是一个有效的激励因素,具有承诺偏好的员工比其他员工需要更少的薪酬激励,更小的工资差异可以激励高努力水平。在最优激励契约设计中承诺偏好与工资差异具有可替代性。当代理人承诺的增加完全依赖于委托人支持时,承诺并不有利于组织效率的提高。模型结论能更好地解释管理实践,尤其是非营利组织的管理实践,有助于管理者在受工资差异限制情况下进行激励机制设计,防止激励扭曲或过度激励引起的效率损失。

关键词(KeyWords)： 组织承诺;组织支持;最优激励;工资差异

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 教育部人文社科青年基金项目“公共部门激励扭曲测评理论与实证研究”(13YJC630241);; 华侨大学科研基金资助项目“公共部门激励扭曲测评”(13SKBS110)

作者(Author): 周碧华,刘涛雄

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• [28]在委托人的效用函数中,关于对代理人支持程度这一项中没有出现βp_iπ,是因为考虑“支持”应该来自于委托人对代理人成本收益的关心,而代理人效用函数中βp_iπ这项本身来自于委托人所代表组织的收益,但委托人对组织收益的关心已由其效用函数中的p_i(π-w_1)+(1-p_i)-(-w_2)这一项代表,如再放入βp_iπ既重复,理论上也说不通。
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